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INTRODUCTION
The wholesale revision of the bankruptcy laws in 19781 had a
particularly dramatic impact upon real property lease transactions.
*Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., New York Univer-
sity, 1976; LL.M., Harvard University, 1980. Early drafts of this Article were prepared
under the guidance of Professor Vern Countryman. I wish to acknowledge his invaluable
assistance and thank him for his country-style warmth and humor.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151104 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as the "Code" or the "Bank-
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To an extent unknown under prior bankruptcy law, 2 the rights of
lease parties are now subject to modification or termination as a
consequence of the intervening bankruptcy of one of the parties.
Section 365s of the Bankruptcy Code, a lengthy and complex set of
provisions, endows the trustee with extraordinary powers to cure,
assume and assign, or reject unexpired leases. These provisions can
be used aggressively by a lease party to terminate lease obligations
with minimum liability, or defensively to cure earlier defaults and
prevent termination. To the extent that lease parties use, or
ruptcy Code"]. Title 11 was enacted as positive law by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979). The Code is a complete revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter referred to
as the "Act" or "Bankruptcy Act"].
The Code was the product of almost ten years of legislative activity. The proposed bills,
committee hearings, reports and debates provide a rich source of information for purposes
of interpretation. A short sketch of the legislative history will prove helpful.
In 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was established
by legislative act. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). After extensive hearings and over
three years later, the Commission delivered to Congress a proposed bankruptcy act. The
proposed act was introduced in the House as H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc.
H91 (1975). The act was also introduced in the Senate as S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REc. S695 (1975) [both bills are hereinafter referred to jointly or separately as the
"Commission Bill"]. The Commission also submitted a lengthy report summarizing the
Commission's recommendations and a section-by-section commentary on the proposed act.
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the "Commission Report"]. A
competing bankruptcy act was also proposed by a coalition of bankruptcy judges who ob-
jected to the Commission's proposal that routine bankruptcies be handled by an administra-
tive agency. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 CONG. REc. H91 (1975); S. 235, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S695 (1975). [Both bills are hereinafter referred to jointly or sepa-
rately as the "Judges' Bill"]. Extensive hearings were held on the bills in the House and
Senate, culminating in the introduction of two new bills, independently prepared by the
staffs of the House and Senate subcommittees. The Senate and House bills differed dramat-
ically in form from the Commission's and Judges' Bills but were quite similar to each other.
H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H125 (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
CONG. REC. S36091 (1977). H.R. 6 was amended twice and re-introduced to the House as
H.R. 8200 on July 11, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Ses., 123 CONG. REc. H22183 (1977). [S. 2266 is
hereinafter referred to as the "Senate Bill" and H.R. 8200 is hereinafter referred to as the
"House Bill"]. The Senate Bill and House Bill were both accompanied by lengthy, explana-
tory reports. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the
"Senate Report"]; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter referred to as
the "House Report"]. In September of 1978 a final compromise bill was presented by the
floor managers of the House and Senate together with a jointly prepared statement which
was read into the House and Senate debates when the compromise bill was reported [here-
inafter referred to as the "House and Senate Debates"]. 124 CONG. REc. H11088-11117,
S17404-34 (1978).
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976) (repealed 1978).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
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threaten to use, the Code to obtain such ends, the stability of long
term leasing arrangements as a mainstay of commercial real estate
transactions is threatened. Of course, there are strong justifications
for the assumption, assignment, and rejection provisions of the
Code. The purpose of this Article is to examine comprehensively
these justifications and to gauge the impact of the Code upon the
expectations and actions of parties to commercial real property
leases. By restricting the review of section 365 to commercial real
property leases, it is contemplated that a complete and uniform
theory of interpretation can be presented for judicial application of
section 365 to real estate leasing arrangements.
In the course of the ensuing analysis of section 365 there will
be many proposals for judicial interpretation and construction,
some of which may be controversial, especially when viewed from
the vantage point of pre-Code law and practice. However, these
proposals are a reflection of the vast difference between the provi-
sions of the Code and those of the Bankruptcy Act. As time
marches on and the Bankruptcy Act fades from view, and as judges
and lawyers implement and define the Code, the context for inter-
pretation of the bankruptcy laws is shifting. Four years after the
effective date of the Code, it is time for a new look at section 365.
Although this Article is structured in the form of a compre-
hensive survey, there are several issues of major importance which
receive special attention. In Section I, Parts A and B, the problem
of the timing of the trustee's election to assume or reject unexpired
leases is addressed. The Code sets forth some time restraints upon
the trustee's election.' However, substantial discretion is left to
bankruptcy judges to expand or restrict these time limitations, and
inquiry must be made into the appropriate standard for exercise of
this discretion. The "reasonable period of time" standard that was
prevalent under the Bankruptcy Act 5 is rejected herein in favor of
a more open-ended test that conditions the trustee's time to elect
upon the provision of adequate protection to the non-debtor party.
4. Id. § 365(d). The time limitations of § 365(d) are discussed at great length. See infra
text accompanying notes 19-41.
5. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941); In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 520 F.2d 741
(10th Cir. 1975); Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de P. R., 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1966); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683
(1942); In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940); In re United Cigar




In Section I, Part C, another problematic timing issue is scru-
tinized. If the trustee in a reorganization case is unsure of the pro-
priety of assumption or rejection, can the reorganization plan pro-
vide for post-confirmation assumption or rejection? Such post-
confirmation election has been approved by at least one circuit
court." However, such a result raises serious concerns in view of the
new voting and confirmation requirements of Chapter 11. It is
strongly asserted herein that such post-confirmation election is in-
consistent with other provisions of the Code and should not be
permitted by the courts.
In Section I, Parts D and E, the standard governing the trus-
tee's power to reject unexpired leases is examined. The standard
itself is now well-established: The trustee may reject only when, in
his "business judgment," it is in the best interest of the creditors
of the estate to do so.7 However, a question has arisen concerning
the parameters of this test in circumstances where the primary ef-
fect of rejection is to benefit a class of secured creditors, rather
than the general, unsecured creditors of the estate. That is, does
the trustee have the power to reject a lease when there is no direct
benefit to unsecured creditors?' To resolve this and related ques-
tions, some specific suggestions for refinement of the business
judgment test are elaborated in Section I, Part E.
Section II investigates the trustee's ability to cure lease de-
faults. Code section 365(b)(1) creates in the trustee a right to cure
lease defaults independently of the express terms of the lease and
applicable state law." The effect of these extraordinary cure provi-
sions, it will be seen, is to grant the bankruptcy trustee the unilat-
6. In re Tilco, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977). See also, Group of Inst'l Inv. v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
7. The business judgment test has been widely adopted. In re Jackson Brewing Co., 567
F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Minges 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Tilco Inc., 558 F.2d
1369 (10th Cir. 1977); King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1068 (1973); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re
Chi-Feng Huang, 23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Summit Land Co., 13 Bankr. 310, 315-
16 (D. Utah 1981); In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 8 Bankr. 237 (W.D. Okla. 1981); In re
Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 Bankr. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal
Corp II, 15 Bankr. 987 (W.D. Ky. 1981); In re "K" Street Ltd. Partnership, 16 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The business judgment test is discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 55-72.
8. This question has arisen in at least two circuits. See In re Jackson Brewing Co., 567
F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978). See also In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982) is set forth infra in the text accompanying note 90.
[Vol. 32
LEASE DISPOSITION IN BANKRUPTCY
eral right to modify the express agreement of the parties. The stat-
utory restraints upon the trustee's ability to cure are discussed at
length in Section II and a strong case is presented for additional,
active judicial scrutiny based upon standards which protect fully
the rights of the non-debtor parties.
Also in Section II, a radical but clearly supportable position is
taken that, in certain cases, the trustee should be able to exercise
his cure rights even though the lease has been properly terminated
under state law prior to the petition and is, therefore, "unexpired."
It is proposed in Section II that, so long as the non-debtor party
can be protected from any prejudice resulting from the cure, in
compelling circumstances the bankruptcy court should exercise its
equity powers to allow the trustee to cure and assume the lease
notwithstanding the fact that there has been a pre-petition
termination.
In Section III the consequences of assumption and rejection
are reviewed. Special attention is devoted to section 365(h)10 which
substantially protects non-debtor lessees from the adverse conse-
quences of rejection. Unfortunately, the application of section
365(h) in accordance with its terms creates a disturbing dilemma.
Because of the protections contained in section 365(h), when per-
formance of the lease obligations by the trustee does not result in a
net loss to the estate, rejection will be of no benefit to the estate.
On the other hand, in those cases when performance will result in
a net loss to the estate, the rejection will usually increase that loss.
The remedy available to the trustee when the lease of a debtor-
lessor is burdensome will be abandonment, not rejection. Conse-
quently, the trustee's ability to reject the leases of debtor-lessors
may be entirely illusory.
Finally, in Section III, Part D of this Article the traditional
limitations on allowance of claims by lessors of rejected or termi-
nated leases is examined.11 Close attention will be paid to some
disturbing language in the legislative history which indicates that
10. Id. § 365(h) is set forth infra in note 198.
11. Id. § 502(b)(7) limits the allowable amount of the claims of non-debtor lessors. The
limitations contained in section 502(b)(7) are modeled after similar limitations in section
63(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. § 103(a)(9) (repealed 1978). These limitations reflect a
congressional intention to prevent the large claims of real property lessors from depleting
the assets available for distribution to other unsecured creditors. See Oldden v. Tonto Re-
alty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944) and the discussion infra accompanying notes 220-23.
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the limitations on allowance of lessors' claims should be imposed
only when the lease is a "true" or "bona-fide" lease rather than a
"financing" lease.1" It will herein be asserted that such a distinc-
tion is inappropriate in view of the provisions of the Code, as en-
acted, and the purposes sought to be served by section 502(b)(7). 3
I. THE TRUSTEE'S ELECTION TO ASSUME OR REJECT
The trustee's election to assume or reject a lease will have a
severe impact upon the estate.1 4 Once a lease is assumed, it is
treated the same as any other lease, contract, or obligation that is
undertaken by the trustee after the filing of the petition: the estate
is liable for full performance of the lease, as an expense of adminis-
tration.1 5 Consequently, the untimely or unwise assumption of a
lease will irrevocably burden the estate with liability for full per-
formance, even though the lease is later rejected.16 On the other
hand, once rejected, the rejection is binding and the estate is per-
manently deprived of any advantages which might have accrued
under the lease.1 7 In view of the impact of assumption or rejection
12. Extensive comments regarding the distinction between "true" and "financing"
leases were read into the Senate and House Debates. See 124 CONG. REC. S17410, H11093
(1973). An example of a "financing" lease is the lease in a sale-leaseback transaction, where
the lease serves primarily as security for repayment of an obligation owing by the "lessee" to
the "lessor."
13. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (1982).
14. Section 541 provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "estate,"
comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case," as well as certain post-petition property of the debtor specified in section
541(a)(5). It is the duty of the trustee to act as representative of the "estate." See id. § 323.
15. Once a lease is assumed the only manner in which the estate can be relieved of
liability for performance is by agreement of all parties, or by assignment of the estate's
interest. Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de P. R., 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966); Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Assoc. v. Smith, 336 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Wil-low
Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Rhymes, Inc., 14 Bankr. 807 (D. Conn.
1981). See also In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976).
16. It is clear under section 365(g)(2) of the Code that once the trustee assumes a lease,
a subsequent rejection is to be treated as a post-petition breach, giving rise to a claim for
breach of the lease which is entitled to administrative expense priority under section 507(b).
See In re Rhymes, Inc., 14 Bankr. 807 (D. Conn. 1981).
17. Once rejected, a lease or contract cannot later be assumed. Pursuant to section
365(g)(1), rejection of an unassumed lease is deemed to be a pre-petition breach of the
lease, giving rise to an allowable pre-petition claim under section 502(g). The binding nature
of rejection is essential to the non-debtor lessor's ability to act in reliance thereon in con-
tracting to relet the premises or, the non-debtor lessee's ability to either terminate the lease
and seek new premises or remain in possession and offset the cost of substitute performance
under section 365(h). This rationale is expressly recognized in Chapter 11. Section
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upon the estate, the trustee must have sufficient time to assure
that his election is in the best interests of the estate.
Even with regard to relatively simple leases, making the deci-
sion to assume or reject may be a difficult and time-consuming
process. In rehabilitation cases where use or occupancy of the
leased premises is contemplated as part of a proposed plan, the
trustee is in an extremely difficult position. Particularly where the
lease is of substantial importance to the continued economic exis-
tence of the debtor, the trustee will certainly not want to reject the
lease until he is sure that a rehabilitation plan cannot be formu-
lated and confirmed. On the other hand, the trustee will not be
willing to assume the lease (and thereby subject the estate to full
liability for its performance) unless he is certain that the other as-
pects of the proposed plan are feasible, and confirmation is proba-
ble. In many rehabilitation cases, if the trustee is to be in a posi-
tion where he can effectively evaluate the consequences of
assumption or rejection, the only reasonable point in time when he
will be able to make an informed judgment about assumption or
rejection will be at the moment when the rehabilitation plan is ac-
tually confirmed. In liquidation cases, or in those rehabilitation
cases in which the lease is not necessary to the business of the re-
organized debtor, the trustee may still have a compelling need for
a substantial period of time to make his election. The trustee will
need sufficient time to undertake a market analysis in order to de-
termine if there is any assignable value in the lease. Also, the trus-
tee must locate an assignee, negotiate the conditions of the assign-
ment, and assure that the assignee can comply with the assignment
requirements of section 365(f).11
A. Timing in Liquidation Cases
The drafters of the Code recognized that the period of time
that the trustee needs to make his election is dependent upon
whether liquidation or rehabilitation is contemplated. Section
365(d) of the Code makes a sharp distinction between liquidation
1123(b)(2) states that a rehabilitation plan may provide for assumption or rejection of leases
"not previously rejected under section 365."
18. As a prerequisite to assignment of a lease, section 365(f)(2)(B) dictates that "ade-
quate assurance of future performance by the assignee [be] provided." See infra notes 96-
109 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the requirement of adequate assurance of
future performance by the assignee.
1983]
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and rehabilitation cases. If the case is a liquidation case under
Chapter 7, section 365(d)(1) provides that: "[I]f the trustee does
not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor within 60 days of the order for relief, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period,
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected."' 9 The 60-day
automatic rejection provision of section 365(d)(1) is derived from
substantially similar language in section 70b of the Bankruptcy
Act,20 as qualified by Bankruptcy Rule 607.21 The rejection is self-
operative upon expiration of the 60-day period and no court ap-
proval is required. Similar to section 70b however, section
365(d)(1) permits the court to extend the 60-day period upon re-
quest of the trustee. From the trustee's viewpoint, it is important
to know under what conditions, and for what period of time, exten-
sions will be granted under the provisions of section 365(d)(1).
The 60-day limitation periods of section 70b of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and section 365(d)(1) of the Code were clearly intended
for the benefit of non-debtor parties, so that they could speedily
determine their rights and status with respect to the estate, at
least in liquidation cases.2 2 However, the significant and irrevoca-
19. The "order for relief" is automatic and effective upon filing of a voluntary petition
pursuant to section 301 or a joint petition pursuant to section 302. In involuntary cases, the
order for relief is issued by the court a short time after filing of the involuntary petition, if
not timely contested by the debtor. See § 303(h). If contested, the order for relief can be
granted only if conditions specified in section 303(h) are satisfied. The Proposed Rules allow
the debtor at least 20 days to respond to the involuntary petition and there may be addi-
tional time required for motions, discovery, and trial. See, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
NEW BANKRuPTcY RULES AND OppIciAL FORMS, Rules 1011-13 (March, 1982) [hereinafter the
"Proposed Rules"]. Thus, in involuntary cases, the 60-day limitation period of 365(d)(1)
may not commence until a significant period of time following the filing of the petition.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). Section 70b provided in pertinent part:
(b) The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an
unexpired lease of real property within sixty days after the adjudication, or
within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but
the court may for cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such contract or
lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed to be rejected. If
a trustee is not appointed, any such contract or lease shall be deemed to be
rejected within thirty days after the date of the order directing that a trustee be
not appointed.
See also Bankruptcy Rule 607.
21. 11 U.S.C. App. - Bankruptcy Rules, Rule 607 (1982).
22. The legislative history preceding enactment of section 70b indicates clearly the
function of the 60-day period. As stated in Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Seas., 80
CONG. REc. H8278 (1936): "This is intended to protect the interests of the other party to the
executory contract or lease. If the trustee fails to act, or if no trustee has been appointed
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ble effects of rejection would seem to mediate in favor of permis-
sive extensions of the 60-day period. In liquidation cases, the bene-
fit to the estate in assuming a lease is the potential increase in the
value of the debtor's assets resulting from the assignment of the
debtor's leasehold interest. Although this is substantially different
from the essential role that a leasehold may play in a rehabilitation
case, there is no justifiable reason why the trustee should be forced
to sacrifice the inherent assignable value in a lease which is
favorable under existing market conditions, due to the trustee's
need for additional time to analyze market conditions or arrange a
suitable assignment. Such an automatic rejection results in a wind-
fall to the lessor at the expense of the other creditors of the estate.
So long as the lessor is not exposed to additional loss or harm dur-
ing the extension period, there is little, if any, justification for de-
nying the extension request.23
Even if there is a possibility of harm arising from the exten-
sion of the 60-day period, 24 the remedy should not be the imposi-
within such period, it is only fair that the other party should know his rights and have the
status of the executory contract or lease settled." Similarly, the House Report and Senate
Report both explain the function of section 365(d) of the Code: "This provision will prevent
parties in contractual or lease relationships with the debtor from being left in doubt con-
cerning their status vis-a-vis the estate." See supra note 1, House Report at 348 and Senate
Report at 59.
23. This position is supported to some extent by the legislative revisions of the early
Senate and House bills. Early versions of the bills limited any extension to 60 days. H.R. 31,
H.R. 32, supra note 1, § 4-602(a)(1). S. 235, S. 236, supra note 1, § 4-602(a)(1). The limiting
language was removed in later versions of the bills, apparently as a congressional approval
of unlimited, or at least lengthier, time periods when, in the bankruptcy court's discretion,
such time is needed by the trustee to make his election.
24. In many cases, delay poses little risk of harm to non-debtor lessors. If the lease is
eventually assumed, the estate is fully liable for performance in accordance with the leased
terms. The preconditions to assumption require that the trustee cure all defaults and pro-
vide adequate assurance of future performance. See infra notes 86-109 and accompanying
discussion of section 365(b)(1). If the lease is eventually rejected, it is well-settled that the
lessor is entitled to payment from the estate, as an administrative expense under section
503(b)(1)(A), of the reasonable fair market value of the estate's use and occupancy of the
leased premises from the time of the filing of the petition until the estate surrenders posses-
sion of the premises. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 321 U.S. 168 (1941); In re Schnabel, 612
F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 567 (1938); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N.Y. Rys., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1922); In re Midtown Skating Corp., 3 Bankr. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Standard Furni-
ture Co., 3 Bankr. 527 (S.D. Cal. 1980). The fair market rental value of such use and occu-
pancy payments has typically, but not always, been fixed at the rent reserved in the lease.
When the lessor is receiving less than the rental amount stated in the lease, however, the
lessor is not harmed by the delay in the trustee's assumption or rejection because, by defini-
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tion of an unreasonably restrictive time period for the trustee to
make his election. In such cases, the "adequate protection" provi-
sions of the Code can provide a fully protective remedy for the
non-debtor lessor, while giving the trustee adequate time to make
a proper election for the benefit of the estate. Section 362(d) enti-
tles an interested party to request relief from the automatic stay
for, among other reasons, "cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party ... Conse-
quently, a non-debtor who is aggrieved by a delay in the trustee's
election to assume or reject a lease can simply move for the provi-
sion of adequate protection of his reversionary interest in the
tion, the lessor is receiving the fair market rental value of the premises-the same return he
would receive if the premises were leased to a new tenant.
There are several factual settings in which a non-debtor lessor would be placed in a
difficult position if the trustee's delay in making his election is lengthy. If the lease is even-
tually rejected and the assets of the estate are insufficient to fully cover administrative ex-
pense claims or if the estate is not actually occupying or using the leased premises, the
lessor will be injured to the extent that the amount he received from distribution of the
estate assets is less than the fair market value of the premises. Of particular concern to the
non-debtor lessor is the performance of obligations which were undertaken by the debtor in
the lease. Particularly in a net lease, the trustee's failure to undertake such obligations
threatens the reversionary interest of the lessor, forcing the lessor to undertake such obliga-
tions at the lessor's cost. Payment of maintenance costs, taxes, and insurance must now be
undertaken by the lessor on behalf of a tenant against whom the lessor cannot proceed for
the full value of his claim in the event of rejection. Also potentially harmful is the uncer-
tainty which accompanies the delay. Since the trustee may cure any defaults independently
of the provisions of the lease, the lessor will be unable to undertake attempts to relet the
property until it is clear that the trustee will reject the lease. Even if the lease defaults are
substantial, the trustee may eventually cure the default, assume the lease, and demand per-
formance by the lessor. Thus, the lessor may lose valuable opportunities to relet the
premises.
25. Adequate protection is a new concept which did not exist under the Bankruptcy
Act. It is described in section 361, but the operative provisions of the Code which require
adequate protection are sections 362(d) (automatic stay), 363(e) (use, sale, and lease of
property of the estate) and 364(d) (obtaining credit). Section 362(d)(1) provides that, upon
request and after notice and hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in inter-
est." Section 361 states that adequate protection may be provided by periodic cash pay-
ments, additional replacement liens or "such other relief, other than entitling such entity to
compensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as
will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's
interest in such property." If prior to the trustee's election a lessor is not receiving sufficient
compensation for the use of the leased premises, or if there is some other prejudice to the
lessor occasioned by the continuation of the lease, it is appropriate for the lessor to move for
relief from the automatic stay or for the provision of adequate protection. See In re Kaiser,
22 Bankr. 383 (W.D. Pa. 1982); In re Barkley-Cupit Enter., Inc., 13 Bankr. 86 (N.D. Ga.
1981); In re P.K. Fox Corp., 12 Bankr. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
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leased premises or, in the alternative, that the stay be lifted and
the non-debtor be free to pursue his state law remedies-including
termination. If the non-debtor makes a sufficient showing that ade-
quate protection is required, the court can then condition an ex-
tension upon the provision of adequate protection by the trustee.
This approach effectively shifts the decision to the party most
likely to reach an efficient solution. The trustee can "purchase" ad-
ditional time to make his election and preserve the value of the
leasehold, if any, for the benefit of the general creditors, but only if
he adequately protects the non-debtor from harm during the ex-
tension period.28
B. Timing in Rehabilitation Cases
In rehabilitation cases the Code provides the trustee with am-
ple time to make an election to assume or reject. Indeed, the elec-
tion may be provided for in the plan, thereby avoiding the
problems inherent in assumption of a lease before the trustee is
sure that the plan is feasible and will be confirmed. However, the
Code does not ignore the countervailing interests of non-debtor
parties who are eagerly awaiting a decision regarding their leases.
Section 365(d)(2) establishes a procedure whereby the non-debtor
can seek a court order requiring the trustee to make an election
within a specified period of time.28 Section 365(d)(2) provides:
[T]he trustee may assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan, but the court, on
26. At least one court has adopted the view that when the non-debtor lessor is receiving
payments for use and occupancy of the premises, the trustee should be granted an extended
period of time to make his election since the lessor was not being "seriously injured." In re
Midtown Skating Corp., 3 Bankr. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Midtown Skating Corp., a
Chapter 11 proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor's principal asset was a lease-
hold interest with a remaining term of 45 years. The premises were used by the debtor as a
skating rink. The lessor moved for an order compelling the trustee to make his election so
that the lessor could determine whether or not to relet the premises. Although the rental
amount stipulated in the lease was $28,500 per month, the court denied the motion and
directed that the debtor-in-possession pay the fair market rental value of the property,
$24,000, as use and occupancy compensation, stating that "the debtor should not be ex-
pected to jump too soon in this complex matter." Id. at 198.
27. Section 1123(b)(2) provides that a plan may, "subject to section 365 of this title,
providfor the assumption or rejection of any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor not previously rejected under section 365 of this title . .. "
28. Proposed Bankruptcy Rule 6006, supra note 19, provides that a proceeding to re-
quire the trustee to act may be initiated by a party to an unexpired lease.
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request of any party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to deter-
mine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such con-
tract or lease."
The Commission, Senate and House Reports indicate that this
provision was intended to assure that a non-debtor party have the
ability to obtain a speedy resolution of the status of his contract or
lease with the debtor.3 0
The non-debtor party to a lease has a strong interest in an
early decision regarding his lease. The uncertainty arising during
the period that the trustee is reaching a decision places the non-
debtor in an uncomfortable position. The trustee cannot coher-
ently undertake action to minimize the effect of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy and to accommodate his own business affairs until the lease
is assumed or rejected. The non-debtor lessor cannot relet the
premises or suspend his own performance, since the trustee may
eventually cure the debtor's defaults, assume the lease, and de-
mand performance by the lessor. On the other hand, the lessor is
discouraged from performing under the lease since it may eventu-
ally be rejected.
The interests of the estate and the non-debtor party will be
incompatible in most circumstances and the bankruptcy court will
have to balance the needs of both parties in determining whether
to impose a specific time limitation upon the trustee. Indeed,
whether the court is faced with a motion by the trustee under sec-
tion 365(d)(1) to extend the 60-day period in a liquidation case, or
a motion by the non-debtor lessor under section 365(d)(2) to limit
the open period in a rehabilitation case, the analysis undertaken
by the court should be the same. The court must balance the po-
tential harm to the non-debtor against the needs of the trustee for
an adequate period of time to make a well-informed decision on
29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
30. The Commission Report, supra note 1, at 200, recommended that "assumption may
take place at any time prior to plan confirmation or in the plan itself but that any norl-
debtor party prejudiced by the delay may obtain a speedy decision."
The Senate Report and House Report explained:
In a rehabilitation case, the time limit is not fixed in the bill. However, if the
other party to the contract or lease requests the court to fix a time, the court
may specify a time within which the trustee must act This provision will pre-
vent parties in contractual or lease relationships from being left in doubt con-
cerning their status vis-a-vis the estate.
See supra note 1, Senate Report at 59, House Report at 348.
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behalf of the general creditors. What criteria can be used to guide
the courts in achieving this balance?
It has been asserted that some guidance and criteria can be
found in the pre-Code cases which allowed the trustee a "reasona-
ble period of time" in which to make his election under section 70b
of the Bankruptcy Act."l Although the term "reasonable period of
time" is certainly acceptable as a general guide for the court, there
is little specific criteria to be found in the pre-Code cases. The pur-
ported doctrine under the Bankruptcy Act was that the trustee
had a reasonable period of time-but only a reasonable period of
time-in which to exercise his election. 2 However, there are no re-
ported cases of an aggrieved non-debtor party seeking a prospec-
tive order to accelerate the trustee's election with respect to its
executory contract or unexpired lease. This judicial "doctrine" did
not develop as a means of quickly resolving the doubts of lease
parties; rather, it is an estate-protective doctrine used responsively
either (i) to justify a restraining order by the bankruptcy court,
prohibiting non-debtor lessors from re-entering or repossessing
leased premises, 3 or (ii) to shield the bankrupt estate from ex post
facto arguments by the non-debtor that the trustee's sluggish re-
jection, or failure to reject, constituted an implicit assumption of
the contract or lease. 4
In the former .instance, several courts adopted the view that
the trustee's need for a reasonable period of time to determine
whether or not to adopt a lease was paramount to the other party's
right to re-enter or repossess the leased property under state law.
In reliance upon the presupposition that the trustee had a reasona-
31. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.),l 365.03[1] at 365-19 [hereinafter referred to
as COLLIER (15th ed.)].
32. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941); In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 520 F.2d
741 (10th Cir. 1975); Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de P. R., 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1966); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683
(1942); In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940); In re United Cigar
Stores of Am. 89 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1937); In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1256
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
33. In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 520 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Chicago Rapid Transit
Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); In re United Cigar Stores Co. of
Am., 89 F.2d 3 (2d Cir..1937); In re Kleinhans, 113 F. 107 (W.D.N.Y. 1902); In re Schwartz-
man, 167 F. 399 (D.C.S.C. 1909).
34. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941); Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Pop-
ular de P. R., 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881
(2d Cir. 1940); In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
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ble period of time in which to assume or reject, the trustee or re-
ceiver was able to support the imposition of restraining orders
against state court repossession proceedings (which, if otherwise al-
lowed, would effectively foreclose the trustee from assuming the
lease), while the trustee decided whether or not to appear in and
defend such actions.3 5
In the second area of judicial use of the "reasonable period of
time" doctrine, the doctrine was raised defensively in response to
arguments by non-debtors that a trustee's tardy rejection, or fail-
ure to reject, constituted an assumption. The courts adopted the
view that there is no fixed period of time in which the trustee must
assume or reject a lease but that the reasonable period of time
within which the election should be made is a matter to be estab-
lished upon request of the non-debtor lease party. Thus, the courts
reasoned, a party who would be adversely affected by late rejection
or failure to reject had an available remedy if the trustee did not
elect within a reasonable time: Such a party could have sought an
affirmative order from the court compelling the trustee to assume
or reject within a reasonable time.36 Since the party could have in-
tervened during the course of the proceedings, the party could not
later argue that, as a matter of equity, the trustee's failure to reject
or take any other action with regard to the lease constituted an
assumption by the estate.
35. In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 520 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Kleinhans, 113 F. 107
(W.D.N.Y. 1902); In re Schwartzman, 167 F. 399 (D.C.S.C. 1909); In re Chicago Rapid
Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); In re United Cigar
Stores Co. of Am., 89 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1937). All of these cases stress the trustee's need for a
reasonable period of time to assume or reject as a justification for staying state court repos-
session proceedings which, if completed, would effectively foreclose the trustee from assum-
ing the leases at issue. A careful reading of the opinions reveals that the courts contem-
plated only a stay of state court proceedings to repossess property in the control of the
trustee so that the trustee, if he decided to assume, could at least have the opportunity to
meaningfully defend the validity of the termination in state court. The courts recognized
that the restraining order would serve to prevent the disruptive effects of immediate divest-
ment of the debtor's leasehold estate while the trustee evaluated the utility of defending
termination in state court-a potentially expensive endeavor.
36. This point was raised by the United States Supreme Court in Philadelphia Co. v.
Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941). The Court there stated:
If, in the opinion of the [non-debtors], a reasonable time has expired [the non-
debtors are] not without redress. [They] may declare a forfeiture of the leases
and abrogate the agreements for non-performance on the part of the trustees, or
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In summary, the pre-Code "doctrine" that the trustee had a
reasonable time to decide whether to assume or reject arose from
retrospective application by the courts to protect the estate; it had
not been applied prospectively in an action brought to limit the
time which the trustee may take to make his election.
It is a major assertion of this Article that to focus upon what
constitutes a "reasonable period of time" distracts one from the
true problem facing the court: the balancing of the competing in-
terests of the trustee and the non-debtor lessor. Particularly in re-
habilitation cases, the trustee must have an extensive period of
time to determine if assumption of the lease is beneficial to the
estate, either because of its importance to the rehabilitative effect,
or because of its positive assignable value. On the other hand, the
non-debtor lessor is faced with uncertainty and potential loss if the
election is delayed. To resolve this dilemma, the question should
not be, What is a reasonable time for the trustee to make his elec-
tion? Rather, the question should be, How much time does the
trustee need to make his election, and what can be done to protect
the non-debtor in the interim?
Unless the non-debtor can show a significant risk of loss re-
sulting from a delay in the trustee's election, the court should re-
luctantly grant motions to limit the open-ended time period of sec-
tion 365(d)(2). In the absence of a clear showing of harm to the
non-debtor, it serves no useful function to restrict the trustee to a
narrow period of time to make a decision which may have drastic
consequences for the other creditors of the debtor. It is only when
the non-debtor can show harm resulting from a delay in election
that the court need consider restricting the trustee's time to make
an election.
Alternatively, assuming that the non-debtor will be harmed by
the delay, 1 if the trustee, in fact, needs a lengthy period of time to
make his decision, should the court then impose upon the trustee a
shorter period of time to make that decision? The answer, of
course, is no. If, in a rehabilitation case, the trustee can rationally
make his decision only upon confirmation of the plan,38 it is unfair
37. The actual risk of loss to non-debtor lessors is slight. See supra note 24.
38. Often the only viable course of action available to the trustee in a rehabilitation
case will be to assume or reject in the provisions of the plan. Unless the lease can clearly be
assigned for positive value, the trustee cannot know whether the lease is valuable to the
estate until the proposed plan is confirmed, a process which is often unpredictable. Al-
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to the general creditors of the estate to force the trustee to make
an earlier election. Even in a liquidating plan, the trustee can ra-
tionally make his election to assume and assign a lease only after
analysis of complex market data. The trustee should not bind the
estate to a potentially asset-reducing lease, nor should the trustee
reject a potentially valuable lease, except upon well-founded, fac-
tual analysis. Compelling an early decision is akin to requiring that
the trustee use a crystal ball."9 Yet it is equally unfair to burden
the non-debtor lessor with a continually increasing loss.40
There is a simple course of action available to the court which
reconciles the interests of both the trustee and the lessor. Rather
than compelling the trustee to make a hasty election, the court can
allow the trustee sufficient time to reach a decision, but condition
though the lease may be essential to a rehabilitative effort, it may be a drain upon the assets
of the estate if the rehabilitative plan is not confirmed. Consequently, it is often impossible
to rationally predict the propriety of assuming a lease until the plan is actually confirmed.
39. This position is supported to some extent by the modifications to early versions of
the Code. The Judges' Bill and Commission Bill strongly favored forcing the trustee to act
in a highly expeditious manner in rehabilitation cases if the other party could show some
harm resulting from further delay. The bills provided that upon request of any party to a
lease, the court or administrator "shall order the assumption or rejection by the trustee
within a specified period of time, not exceeding thirty days, if further delay would result in
prejudice to such party." (emphasis added) H.R. 31, H.R. 32, S. 235, S. 236, supra note 1, §
4-602(a)(2). Without explanatory comment, later versions of the bills substituted the cur-
rent language of section 365(d)(2) for the above-quoted language, perhaps indicating the
congressional realization that the discretion of the court would prove more appropriate than
a fixed time period in circumscribing the period of time in which the trustee can make his
election.
This position is also supported by the well-reasoned holding in In re Midtown Skating
Corp., 3 Bankr. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In that Chapter 11 proceeding, the court denied a
motion by the non-debtor lessor to compel the debtor-in-possession to make an election
regarding its lease. The court reasoned the lessor's request for a time limitation to be placed
upon the trustee in assuming or rejecting the lease would not be granted so long as the
lessor was receiving sufficient payments from the trustee for the estate's use and occupancy
of the premises to prevent the lessor from being "seriously injured."
40. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of timing in Theatre Hold-
ing Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982). In that case the non-debtor lessor had
successfully moved before the bankruptcy court for an order under section 365(d)(2) limit-
ing to 30 days the time period which the debtor-in-possession would have to make its elec-
tion. Although the debtor was actively searching for a substitute tenant, the Court of Ap-
peals upheld the shortened time period because of the failure of the debtor-in-possession to
make rental, tax or other payments to the lessor. As the court noted "[tihe debtor's contin-
ued occupation of the land, coupled with its failure to pay taxes, could damage the lessors
beyond the compensation available under the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 106. The court also
noted with approval the bankruptcy judge's reasoning that allowing the debtor-in-possession
to maintain its freedom to assume or reject the lease without paying for use of the property
would be allowing the debtor to "have its cake and eat it too." Id. at 105.
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the extended time period upon the trustee's providing to the lessor
adequate protection for any loss the lessor may suffer as a result of
the delay.41 Under this approach, the trustee is assured of suffi-
cient time to make his election, while the lessor is assured against
loss resulting from the delay. There is an additional spin-off bene-
fit to this approach since the trustee then has a pecuniary incen-
tive to reach a decision as soon as is feasible, in order to reduce
potential payments to the lessor in the event that the lease is even-
tually rejected. On the other hand, if there is little or no loss to the
lessor, the trustee will have the freedom to take a substantial pe-
riod of time to make an election. The court is minimally involved
in the task of determining an appropriate period of time for the
trustee to make a decision, while the economic realities will compel
the trustee to take action in an efficient manner.
In conclusion, so long as the trustee can bear an initial burden
of showing that additional time is needed to make an election, the
court should liberally allow the trustee additional time under sec-
tion 365(d) in all circumstances. However, when the non-debtor
can show that a loss will result from the delay, the court should
condition the trustee's extended time period upon the provision of
adequate protection to the non-debtor.
C. Assumption or Rejection in the Provisions of the Plan
If the non-debtor is unsuccessful in obtaining a court order
under section 365(d)(2) compelling the trustee to make an election
prior to the confirmation of the plan, can the provisions of the plan
provide for rejection at some future date or contingent upon some
future event? Section 1123(b)(2) states that a plan may "provide"
for assumption or rejection. 42 Could, then, a confirmed plan pro-
41. See supra note 25, for a discussion of "adequate protection."
42. It is possible that a lease may be neither assumed nor rejected in the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding or in the provisions of the plan. A failure to assume or reject can
have grave consequences for the non-debtor. For example, in Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise
Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d. 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940), a section 77B
proceeding, the plan provided for the transfer of the debtor's assets, including the debtor's
leasehold estate, to a new corporation. The assignee corporation did not expressly assume
the lease and defaulted shortly after confirmation. The court held that the assignee corpora-
tion was liable only for rent while in possession, since the assignee corporation was only in
"privity of estate" not "privity of contract" with the lessor. The lessor could seek damages
for breach of the lease only against the original party to the lease-the now asset-less shell
of the debtor corporation. The court in Mohonk noted that the lessor was entitled to insist
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vide that assumption or rejection be contingent upon some future,
post-confirmation event? In In re Tilco, Inc.,43 such a plan was ap-
proved. The plan provided that, after notice and hearing, the
bankruptcy court could authorize the trustee to assume or reject a
lease at some future date. If rejected, the trustee was to pay a fixed
percentage of the claim arising from rejection. Such a procedure is
subject to criticism under the Bankruptcy Act and is definitely
contrary to many provisions of the Code."
Prior to Tilco, it was well settled under the Bankruptcy Act
that the non-debtor lessor was entitled to insist that its lease be
assumed or rejected at some point during the proceedings, or in
the plan itself.45 The reasons were threefold: (i) to allow the non-
debtor to file a claim for termination of its lease and participate in
distribution under the plan if the lease was rejected; (ii) to allow
the non-debtor to participate actively as a creditor in the formula-
tion and confirmation of the plan in the event its lease was re-
jected; and (iii) to provide full disclosure to the other participants
of the plan of the payments to be made in satisfaction of the non-
debtor's claim in the event of rejection, or the obligations to be
assumed by the estate in the event of assumption.4"
that its lease be assumed or rejected in the original bankruptcy proceedings and, therefore,
the court refused to reopen the case and permit the lessor to file a claim. Accord, In re
Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940); Consolidated Gas and Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. United Rys. and Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1936) cert. denied, 300 U.S.
663 (1937).
43. 558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
44. A similar contingent rejection provision was approved in Group of Inst'l Inv. v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943). In that section 77 railroad
reorganization proceeding, the bankrupt railroad was the lessee under a net lease of railroad
trackage pursuant to which the railroad was obligated to pay all costs of maintenance and
repair and the debt service on outstanding bonds secured by a lien on the leased property.
The reorganization plan, prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission, provided that
the lease would be rejected if the lessor and bondholders did not agree to modifications of
the terms of the lease and the bonds. The Court held the plan permissible. Unfortunately,
the Court did not consider any of the issues later raised in the text of this Article concerning
the effect of such contingent rejection upon the lessor's ability to participate as a creditor in
the formulation and confirmation of the plan. As discussed later in the text, the case can be
distinguished as applying solely to railroad reorganization proceedings under section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act.
45. Federal's Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1977); Mohonk Realty
Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940);
Consolidated Gas and Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. and Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1937); In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d
881 (2d Cir. 1940).
46. The general concern was to assure that all creditors affected by the proceedings
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Although the plan in Tilco contained a procedure for payment
of claims arising from possible rejection of the lease, the court
failed to confront the other significant effects of contingent rejec-
tion. The plan in Tilco provided for the possible rejection of sev-
eral executory contracts for the sale of natural gas. It is not clear
from the facts of the case whether the non-debtor parties consti-
tuted a significant number of creditors or if the amount of their
claims was substantial in relation to other unsecured claims. Yet
the procedure confirmed in Tilco effectively denied to these poten-
tial creditors an opportunity to participate in the plan process even
though their number and the amount of their claims may have
given them the leverage to alter or prevent confirmation of the
plan. In addition, the procedure approved in Tilco also created the
possibility that the creditors who did participate in the plan may
have been induced to approve a plan without full knowledge of the
effects of future rejection or assumption upon the chances for suc-
cess of the debtor's rehabilitation or the value of their own inter-
ests in the successor debtor. That such a procedure is unfair to
non-debtor parties and contrary to the confirmation requirements
of the Bankruptcy Act had been recognized in several pre-Code
cases.
47
Under the Code, the effect of permitting a contingent rejection
following plan confirmation would serve to circumvent the exten-
sive voting requirements and the protective confirmation provi-
have an opportunity to fully participate in the confirmation process.
47. In Consolidated Gas and Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. and Elec. Co., 85
F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1936), it was held that even where the non-debtor would be fully compen-
sated for its claim arising from a post-confirmation rejection, the rejection must be accom-
plished no later than in the unconditional provisions of the plan. The court stated in sup-
port of its holding:
This must be so not only because an injured contractor must be given an oppor-
tunity to share as a creditor in the formation of the plan and the distribution of
securities, but also because the kind and amount of securities to be allotted to
the several classes of creditors must be disclosed in any plan that is submitted to
the creditors and stockholders for their acceptance.
Id. at 803. Similarly, in In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), it was stated: "Any person that is injured by. . . rejection is deemed a creditor for
the purpose of Chapter XI and confirmation of the Arrangement ... It is only fair that
such a person be apprised of his rights in time to participate in the acceptance procedure."
Id. at 613. See also In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940); Fed-
eral's, Inc. v. Edmonton, 555 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1977); Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe
Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940).
1983]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
sions of sections 1121,48 1126, 4 and 1129.50 A lease party who is
transformed into a creditor by such a posthumous contingent re-
jection should not only be entitled to pro-rata payment of his un-
secured claim (or payment as an administrative expense if the
lease was previously assumed),5 but should be entitled, as a credi-
tor: (i) to propose a plan under section 1121(c); 51 (ii) to object to
confirmation of a plan under sections 1129(a)(7) and (a)(8);5 3 and
(iii) to vote upon a plan pursuant to section 1126.54 In short, a plan
such as that in Tilco excludes a specific, limited class of creditors
from the benefits of the statutory scheme set forth in the Code,
regardless of the size of their claims or the number of creditors
affected-a gerrymandering effect which circumvents the voting
provisions of the Code. There is no statutory support for such an
exclusion. It would seem that the plan should, in the absence of
further statutory guidance, unconditionally provide for the as-
sumption or rejection of unexpired leases so as to assure that all
creditors who are affected by the plan have an opportunity to fully
participate in the confirmation process.
D. Rejection of Leases-Standards of Rejection
Section 365 represents a significant change from the compara-
ble provisions of section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act.15 Section 70b
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982).
51. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
52. § 1121(c) provides that:
Any party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee,
an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or
any indenture trustee, may file a plan if and only if-
(1) a trustee has been appointed under this chapter;
(2) the debtor has not filed a plan before 120 days after the date of the order for
relief under this chapter; or
(3) the debtor has not filed a plan that has been accepted, before 180 days after
the date of the order for relief under this chapter, by each class the claims or
interests of which are impaired under the plan.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7), (8) (1982).
54. § 1126 (a) "provides that: "The holder of a claim or interest allowed under section
502 of this title may accept or reject a plan . .. ."
55. Section 70b, 11 U.S.C. 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1978), of the Bankruptcy Act was the
principal provision governing the trustee's power to assume, assign, and reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases. There were few express restrictions upon the trustee's abil-
ity to assume or reject under the Bankruptcy Act. The restrictions in the rather rambling
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imposed only a few, limited restrictions upon the trustee's ability
to assume or assign unexpired leases. Section 365 implements a
comprehensive scheme, applying specific criteria, to determine
whether the trustee can exercise his ability to assume or assign a
lease. As in section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act however, there is a
conspicuous absence in section 365 of any standards governing the
trustee's power to reject unexpired leases. As a practical matter,
sections 365(h), (i) and (j) provide substantial protection for non-
debtor lessees and vendees of rejected real property leases and real
property installment contracts.5 6 However, those sections are effec-
tive only following rejection; they do not provide standards for re-
jection. The protective rights afforded to non-debtors by those sec-
tions may affect the trustee's practical analysis of whether or not
to reject, but they create no limitation upon his power to reject.
Other than these practical limitations, there are no express provi-
sions in the Code which limit the trustee's election to reject.
Therefore, it is important to turn to pre-Code case law to examine
language of section 70b could be paraphrased as follows: (i) in liquidation cases the contract
or lease had to be assumed within a 60-day period or the contract or lease would be deemed
rejected; (ii) ipso facto insolvency termination provisions in leases would be enforced against
the trustee; (iii) rejection of the lease of a debtor-lessor would not deprive the lessee of his
estate; and (iv) assignment of an assumed contract or lease would release the trustee from
liability only if such assignment was preceded by notice and hearing and was subject to
"such terms and conditions as the court may fix." The generality of the latter three restric-
tions and the absence of further statutory guidance regarding the conditions upon which the
trustee could assume, assign, or reject contracts and leases (as well as the absence of statu-
tory guidance as to the effect of assumption, assignment or rejection) created a great deal of
uncertainty under the Bankruptcy Act. The resulting commentary and case law, which is
often conflicting and, equally often, confusing, is discussed in latter parts of this Article.
The Code presents substantial clarification of many areas left open by section 70b.
Section 70b was found not inconsistent with, and therefore applicable to, the other chapters
of the Bankruptcy Act in a variety of applications. See Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300
(1945); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979); Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 467 (1964) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Silverstein]; Lynn & Franklin, Lease Bankruptcy Termination Clauses & the
Equitable Powers of the Chapter XI Court, 15 Hous. L. REv. 283 (1978). The other chap-
ters of the Bankruptcy Act also contained independent authority to reject executory con-
tracts and leases; § 77 (railroad reorganizations); § 116(1) (Chapter 10); § 313(1) (Chapter
11); § 413(1) (Chapter 12). 11 U.S.C. §§ 207, 516(1), 713(1), 813(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
56. Sections 365(h), (i), and (0) provide significant protection to real property lessees,
and real property vendees in possession, who are affected by rejection of their lease, or con-
tract, with the debtor. Primarily, such parties are assured of continued possession and a
right to offset against rental, or contract payments, the cost of performing the debtor's de-
faulted obligations. Section 365(h), concerning real property lessees, is discussed in substan-
tial detail later in the text. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
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the conditions and restrictions imposed by the courts upon the
trustee's power to reject contracts and leases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The courts have long imposed upon the trustee the limitation
that he can reject only those contracts and leases which are "bur-
densome" to the estate. An examination of the relevant cases will
reveal that this judicially-imposed prerequisite to rejection has
evolved from a strict objective test into a weakened and confused
balancing test that leaves the decision to reject a lease primarily to
the discretionary "business judgment" of the trustee.
The trustee's ability to reject executory contracts and
unexpired leases existed prior to enactment of section 70b of the
Bankruptcy Act.5 7 It was based upon the trustee's duty to rid the
estate of all property, including contractual or lease obligations,
which were onerous or burdensome to the estate, since acceptance
of such property would diminish, rather than augment, the assets
of the estate. It is relatively well-settled that the enactment of sec-
tion 70b was meant to be a codification of this existing right of the
trustee to abandon or reject burdensome assets.58 Viewing the rele-
vant provisions of section 70b as derived from the right to reject
burdensome assets, the courts consistently applied the provisions
of section 70b to limit the trustee's power of rejection only to those
contracts and leases which were found to be burdensome to the
estate, notwithstanding the absence of any statutory requirement
that such a finding was necessary.5 9
Exactly what constitutes a "burdensome" contract or lease has
not been readily agreed upon by the courts and remains somewhat
unclear today. In American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New
57. Section 70b was enacted as part of the Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat.
840 (1938), and later amended, Pub. L. No. 87-681, 76 Stat. 570 (1962).
58. See, Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 227 (1936); 2 COLLIER (15th ed.),
supra note 31, 1 365.01, at 365-9. For a complete discussion of the historical precedents of
the trustee's ability to abandon burdensome assets see, Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's
Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1291, 1293-95 (1971); Note, Abandonment
of Assets By a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1953); and Silverstein, supra
note 55.
59. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922);
In re Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2a 1369 (10th Cir. 1977); King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51,
56 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) affd sub nom Cohen v. East Netherland Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1958); In re Duplan Corp., 455 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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York Railways,"0 it was held that a contract or lease must be a
positive drain upon the assets of the estate, not merely unfavorable
under existing market conditions, before it could be rejected by the
trustee as burdensome. The court refused, in that equity receiver-
ship case, to affirm the rejection of a lease where there was no
showing that the acceptance and performance by the receiver
would result in a net loss to the estate.61
The Supreme Court did, however, evoke a different test in
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific Railroad Co. 2 In that section 77 railroad reorganization,
the debtor was the lessee under a net lease of railroad trackage,
pursuant to which the debtor-lessee had undertaken, among other
obligations, the payment of mortgage bonds secured by the leased
railroad lines. The reorganization plan, formulated by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) and approved by the district
court, provided for the rejection of the lease unless the holders of
the mortgage bonds agreed to a modification of the payment terms
of the bonds. A report prepared by the I.C.C. indicated that there
were substantial negative aspects which would militate against as-
sumption of the lease in the absence of such modifications. How-
ever, there was no express finding in the I.C.C. report or the dis-
trict court opinion that the lease, when considered in its entirety,
was a net loss to the estate. Rejection of the lease was contem-
plated by the I.C.C. principally as a device to force the lessor and
its bondholders to renegotiate the terms of their agreements affect-
ing the operation of the debtor's railroad. The lessor argued that
60. 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
61. The court was unequivocal in asserting that the comparative benefit to the estate
resulting from rejection was insufficient to justify rejection. In defining "burdensome," the
court expounded:
[A] court of equity should not instruct a receiver to disaffirm a lease as landlord
merely because the corporation lessor made what, at this moment, might be a
bad bargain, although a good enough bargain originally. It is the duty of the
receiver to make every proper effort to increase the assets of an estate, but not
at the expense of fundamental principles of fair dealing. When a lessee under a
lease takes possession, the lease presupposes continuance, even in the face of a
receivership of the landlord, so long as the landlord's receivership estate is not
burdened or put to loss, and by "burdened" is not meant that the lease could be
more profitable, but that it entails a positive loss or encroachment on the corpus
or capital of the estate.
Id. at 843.
62. 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
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the debtor had received, and would continue to receive, a net
financial benefit from the operation of the leased lines and, conse-
quently, the lease was not burdensome.
In affirming the rejection of the lease the Court held that it
was irrelevant whether or not the lease constituted a net loss to the
estate. Instead, the Court held that, at least in section 77 proceed-
ings, the decision to reject a lease as burdensome should be based
upon the business judgment of the I.C.C. and the district court,
subject to review only for an abuse of discretion in exercising that
judgment. The Court emphasized:
[T]he Commission (and the District Court) have the authority in approving a
plan to condition acceptance of a lease on terms which are necessary or ap-
propriate to keep the fixed charges within proper limits or to do equity be-
tween claims which arise under the lease and the other claims against the
debtor. Like the question whether a lease is burdensome. . . , one phase of
that problem is whether the lease is worth its annual charge. A disregard in
that determination of the sacrifices which other creditors are making would
be wholly incompatible with the standards which § 77 has prescribed for re-
organization plans.. . . Thus, the question whether a lease should be rejected
and, if not, on what terms it should be assumed is one of business judgment. 3
It is interesting to note that the Court had engaged in deter-
mining whether a public agency, the I.C.C., had authority to deter-
mine the question of rejection. The opinion makes numerous refer-
ences to, and relies heavily upon, the investigative reports of the
I.C.C. The reports indicated that, in the absence of the proposed
modifications, a retention of the leased lines would jeopardize the
reorganization effort. The Court was not affirming the simple find-
ings of a private trustee, but was acquiescing in the judgment of an
agency charged under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act with pre-
paring a plan compatible with the public interest.64 In other cases,
both before and after the decision in Group of Institutional Inves-
tors, the Court has made a significant point of distinguishing sec-
tion 77 proceedings from other proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act based upon the primary and basic duty of the I.C.C. to prepare
63. Id. at 550.
64. The Court phrased the issue rather clearly as one concerning the authority of the
LC.C. to reject the lease.* The Court posited the inquiry as follows: "If the Commission had
authority to determine the question of rejection in the manner indicated and if it complied
with legal requirements for the exercise of the authority, the modifications which it pro-
posed and which the District Court approved are valid." Id. at 547.
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a plan which is in furtherance of the public interest.65 Thus, in
view of the nature of the proceedings and the involvement of the
I.C.C., it was quite possible that subsequent decisions might have
narrowly limited the business judgment test of Group of Institu-
tional Investors to railroad reorganization proceedings, or at least
extended the test only to Chapter X reorganization proceedings in
which the large scale interests of public stockholders were to be
protected.
The majority of courts which have considered the issue, how-
ever, have adopted the business judgment test of Group of Institu-
tional Investors in proceedings other than railroad reorganiza-
tions. 8 In In re Minges,6 7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
expressed articulately the desirablity and justification of applying
the business judgment test in all rehabilitation proceedings. That
justification is compelling. In Minges, the trustee of an individual
debtor-lessor in a Chapter XII proceeding sought to reject certain
covenants of the debtor under a lease of office space in the debtor's
office building, including the debtor's obligation to provide basic
utilities and janitorial services.68 The bankruptcy judge and dis-
65. See Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & Steamship Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123,
132 (1946); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 87 (1939).
66. The business judgment test has been expressly adopted in the following cases: In re
Jackson Brewing Co., 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978) (Chapter 10); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1979) (Chapter 11); In re Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977) (Chapter 10);
King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973) (Chapters 10 and
11); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (railroad reor-
ganization); In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Summit Land Co.,
13 Bankr. 310, 315 (D. Utah 1981); In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 8 Bankr. 237 (W.D.
Okla. 1981); In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 8 Bankr. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Hurri-
cane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II, 15 Bankr. 987 (W.D. Ky. 1981); In re "K" Street Ltd. Partner-
ship, 16 Collier Bankr. Cas. 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Chapter 12).
The "net loss" test of American Brake Shoe has been adopted only by two bankruptcy
courts. See, In re Vidicom Sys., Inc., 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975); In
Re D.H. Overmeyer Co., 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1974). These cases are
of doubtful authority in view of the later decisions of the Second Circuit discussed in the
text.
67. 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
68. The court in In re Minges carefully noted that there was some dispute under the
Bankruptcy Act regarding whether the trustee could reject only some of the covenants in a
lease or if the trustee's rejection must be exercised with respect to the entire lease. Id. at 38.
The question arose as a result of language in the "savings clause" provision of section 70b of
the Bankruptcy Act which provided that "rejection of the lease or any covenant therein by
the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the lessee of his estate" (emphasis added). Gener-
ally, it was assumed that leases must be rejected as a whole but there was no definitive
declaration by the courts on this matter. See, 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed.),
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trict court affirmed the rejection without finding that the lease
constituted a net loss to the estate. The lessee appealed, asserting
that the business judgment test of Group Of Institutional Inves-
tors should be limited to railroad reorganizations or bankruptcy
proceedings involving comparable public interest. The court re-
jected the lessee's argument that the net loss of American Brake
Shoe be applied and explained:
[I]n bankruptcy proceedings the trustee, and ultimately the court, must exer-
cise their discretion fairly in the interest of all who have had the misfortune
of dealing with the debtor. A rigid test, permitting rejection only where the
executory contract will cause a net loss to the debtor's estate if berformed,
might work a substantial injustice in cases where it can be shown that the
non-debtor contracting party will reap substantial benefits under the contract
while the debtor's creditors are forced to make substantial compromises of
their claims29
The court's analysis is extremely sound and would appear to be
the proper standard for evaluating the propriety of the trustee's
rejection of contracts and leases under section 365 of the Code.70
The expectation of value to the estate is as important to the un-
derlying purposes of the bankruptcy laws as the prevention of net
loss. To the extent that the enhanced value of the lease can be
realized for the estate, the business judgment test allows the trus-
tee to obtain that value. If the trustee were prohibited from re-
jecting a contract or lease which can be renegotiated under market
conditions favorable to the debtor, the estate might suffer a far
greater loss, occasioned by the inability of the trustee to capitalize
upon the full market value of the debtor's assets, than under re-
lated circumstances where a net loss is occasioned by a rise in the
cost of the debtor's performance.7 1 Thus, the courts have properly
3.15[7]. The court in In re Minges never reached this issue, disaflirming the trustee's rejec-
tion on other grounds.
69. 602 F.2d at 43.
70. The Commission Report, supra note 1, clearly supports the business judgment test
for application in all proceedings:
[Tihe Commission has concluded that the proposed Act should not impose a
requirement that rejection can occur only if the trustee shows that assumption
would be burdensome. Such a requirement is unnecessary in light of the trus-
tee's general duty to maximize return to creditors and might stimulate after the
fact reappraisals demanding from the trustee the quality of prescience.
Id. at 200.
71. This position is supported by Professor Krasnowieki, who points out:
The purpose of the power to reject is to augment the estate of the debtor. For
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shifted the standard of rejection to a standard which permits the
trustee (who is the person in the best position to gather relevant
information) to weigh all of the business factors surrounding as-
sumption or rejection and to reject the contract or lease whenever
it will be economically beneficial to the estate to do so.
There is additional justification for the business judgment
test. From the non-debtor's viewpoint, the rejection of a lease
based upon the trustee's determination that rejection is beneficial,
leaves the non-debtor in no worse a position than the other general
creditors of the estate. The non-debtor lessee who has not other-
wise secured his interest is in a position indistinguishable from
other unsecured creditors of the estate who have changed their ec-
onomic positions in reliance upon their expectation of the debtor's
future performance. All have substantially undertaken business re-
lations, made investments and otherwise acted in reliance upon the
debtor's continuing economic viability. In all cases, the aggrieved
parties, whether creditors, lease parties or contracting parties, are
left with an unsecured claim for the damages resulting from the
debtor's failure to comply with their expectations. Only in the case
of real property lessees and vendees are aggrieved parties given ad-
ditional rights or protection with regard to the trustee's rejection.72
Except to the extent that contract and lease parties are given such
special protection under express provisions of the Code, they
should not be able to prevent the termination of their agreements
with the debtor based upon the fortuitous and formalistic criteria
of American Brake Shoe. As the court recognized in Minges, the
rejection should be based on the effect upon the estate, not the
this purpose there seems to be no difference between an obligation which con-
sumes cash, and an obligation which, because of its depressive effect on a partic-
ular asset or because of its undervaluation of that asset consumes a part of the
value of that asset. In the end the latter will turn up as a net reduction in cash
to pay the creditors.
Krasnowieki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Reform Act on Real Estate Development
and Financing, 53 AM. BKAN. L.J. 363, 382 (1979).
72. Except for the protection afforded to real property lessees and vendees under sec-
tions 365 (h), (i) and (j), the parties to rejected executory contracts and unexpired leases are
treated much like unsecured creditors. Unless the debtor's performance has been otherwise
secured, contract or lease parties are entitled to file damage claims which are treated as pre-
petition, unsecured claims but are given no greater protection vis-a-vis their disappointed
reliance expectations, than unsecured creditors. § 502 (g).





E. Rejection of Leases-Applying the "Business Judgment"
Test
The evolution of the business judgment test and the desirab-
lity of applying it in all proceedings has been discussed herein at
some length so as to clearly outline its applicability to cases under
the Code, and to raise an important issue. In exercising his busi-
ness judgment to reject a lease when it is beneficial to the "estate"
to do so, in whose interest should the trustee be acting? Is he lim-
ited to exercising his business judgment so as to benefit the general
creditors of the estate, or is rejection also justified when it primar-
ily will benefit secured creditors? The question is of significant im-
portance in those circumstances when the leased property is sub-
ject to a security interest subordinate to the lease. In such
circumstances, rejection will contribute primarily to the realization
of the claims of the holders of the subordinate security interests,
while diluting the participation of unsecured creditors nd equity
holders.
The problem can perhaps best be illustrated by reference to
the circumstances of the Penn Central Transportation Company
reorganization. 3 In that proceeding the trustees sought to reject
numerous ground leases of the debtor-lessor's property. The leases
contained rental terms far below the market rental which the
trustees could obtain if the leases were renegotiated at the time of
reorganization. The trustees' purpose in seeking to reject the leases
was to enable them to increase the rentals under the leases to mar-
ket value, thereby increasing the sales price of the leases which
were then to be assigned pursuant to an asset disposition
program.
7 4
The primary impact of the rejection would be to create an ex-
traordinarily large group of unsecured claims against the estate for
73. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
74. Whether the rejection of the leases would result in an increased rental was not set-
tled under the Bankruptcy Act. The "savings clause" provision of section 70b provided that
rejection of a real property lease would not deprive the lessee of his "estate." Whether or
not the lessee's "estate" included the right to continue occupancy at the rent reserved in the
lease was an unresolved question which evoked a mountain of commentary. The authorities
listed infra, note 179, devote significant attention to this issue. The Court in Penn Central
disallowed rejection and, consequently, did not expound further on this issue.
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damages arising from the rejection. The large increase in the pool
of unsecured claims would diminish any pro-rata distribution
among unsecured creditors, as well as increase the total claims to
be satisfied prior to distribution to equity holders. The commensu-
rate increase in the value of the leases would be subject to the ex-
tensive claims of several secured creditors that had valid security
interests in the debtor's general assets. Thus, despite the fact that
such secured creditors held liens subordinate to the leasehold in-
terests of the lessees under state law, the principal effect of rejec-
tion would be to elevate the junior secured liens to a superior sta-
tus, thereby increasing the amount of the lienholders' claims
entitled to priority distribution-while detrimentally affecting the
interests of the lessees, unsecured creditors, and equity holders.
The court in the Penn Central case, after perceptively raising this
issue, disallowed the rejection on other grounds and did not elabo-
rate any further upon whether it would have permitted the trustee
to reject the leases if, as described, the rejection benefited primar-
ily secured creditors.
The issue was reached by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Matter of Jackson Brewing Company.7 5 In that Chapter X pro-
ceeding, the trustee sought to reject an option contract to purchase
real property of the debtor which, at the time of attempted exer-
cise by the optionee (which occurred during the pendency of the
proceedings), was valued at over five million dollars. The option
was purchased at a cost of one thousand dollars and provided for a
purchase price of only $2.8 million. Following the grant of the op-
tion, the debtor incurred substantial debt, secured largely by mort-
gages upon the optioned property. When the trustee sought to re-
ject the option contract the optionee objected on the grounds that
the value of the mortgages exceeded the value of the optioned
property. Therefore, the rejection would be of benefit only to the
mortgagees despite the fact that the option might be superior to
the mortgages under state law.76
Seizing upon the gross disparity between the option price and
the fair market value of the property, the court permitted the re-
75. 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978).
76. It appears that the option was not recorded but that the mortgagees had actual
notice of its existence. It is possible that under applicable state law the mortgages may have
been superior to the option contract. The court, however, never undertook to determine




[The optionee] has assiduously avoided explaining how an option granted for
five years for a consideration of $1,000 to purchase land-worth at least $5.1
million-for $2,777,128.44 could be anything but an onerously burdensome
contract to the [debtor's] estate no matter who, secured or unsecured credi-
tors, ultimately benefits from the rejection."
Furthermore, the court expressly adopted the conclusions of law of
the district court, which had held:
[If the secured creditor] had a secured claim equal to or in excess of the value
of the property, there is nothing inequitable about permitting it to recover its
claim as a secured creditor through a corporate reorganization proceeding,
particularly when compared to permitting others who have expended little or
no effort and who have risked no capital whatsoever, other than $1,000 to
recoup millions of dollars in benefits."8
The implications of the court's holding are quite disturbing. If
the mortgages were valid and the liens exceeded the value of the
debtor's property, the effect of rejecting the option contract (as-
suming it was superior under state law) would be to increase the
value of the mortgagees' security. At the same time, the reduction
in the unsecured claims of the mortgagees would be offset by the
simultaneously generated claim of the optionee for loss resulting
from the rejected option contract.7 9 The court in Jackson Brewing
77. Id. at 621.
78. Id. at 623.
79. In addition to generating a claim for lost profits by the optionee, the rejection
served to deprive the estate of income from the sale of property to the optionee free of the
junior mortgages. Using approximate figures, suppose (i) that the mortgages secured re-
course debts of $7 million, (ii) the option contract set a purchase price of $2 million and (iii)
the property was valued at $5 million. If the mortgage liens were inferior under applicable
state law, failure to reject would result in an unsecured claim by the mortgagees in the
amount of $7 million. Upon exercise of the option, the estate would receive $2 million in
cash. On the other hand, if rejected, the mortgagees' unsecured claims would be reduced by
the value of the security to $2 million, but the optionee would file an unsecured claim for
lost profit of $3 million. Since the estate would be sacrificing the $2 million income from sale
of the property, the $2 million reduction in unsecured claims is a meaningless savings for
unsecured creditors. Thus, there is no discernible benefit to general creditors from the rejec-
tion-it functions primarily to transfer the "windfall" from the optionee, who had pur-
chased that right under state law, to the mortgagees, who had never expected to obtain such
priority for their liens.
An interesting question raised by the Jackson Brewing Co. case concerns the trustee's
avoidance of the mortgage Hens. If, under section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act the optionee
had priority under state law, then the liens of the mortgages could be avoided. After re-
jecting the option for the "benefit" of the secured creditors, could the trustee then avoid
their claims on the basis of section 70e?
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Company stopped short of inquiring, or requiring the trustee to
inquire, into the effects of rejection upon the general creditors of
the estate. In the absence of a more thorough evaluation, it was
obviously dangerous to permit rejection based solely upon a deter-
mination that secured creditors would benefit from the rejection.
Such benefit to secured creditors was by no means a gauge of bene-
fit or detriment to the other creditors of the estate.
There is a second and far more bothersome aspect to the
court's holding in Jackson Brewing Company. Assuming that the
general creditors of the estate were not significantly affected by the
rejection, then the effect of the rejection was to decide who, as be-
tween a secured creditor and another party having an interest in
specific property of the debtor, should be entitled to priority in
satisfaction of their competing claims. In the absence of the inter-
vening bankruptcy of the debtor, such competing interests would
ordinarily be resolved by reference to state law. It is quite likely
that as between the optionee and the mortgagees in Jackson Brew-
ing Company, had the optionee complied with state notice and / or
recording requirements, the optionee would have had priority
under state law. Yet, without any reference to state law, the court
allowed the trustee to effectively rearrange the priorities of the
mortgagees and optionee based upon what the trustee, in his busi-
ness judgment, thought to be an equitable distribution of claims to
property of the debtor in which the debtor had little, if any, eq-
uity. Such a summary rearrangement of priorities of the parties
without reference to applicable state law is clearly improper unless
some countervailing purpose embodied in the bankruptcy laws is
vindicated.80
It is difficult to conceive of a compelling underlying reason for
circumventing state priority laws so as to place the mortagagees in
a superior position to the optionee merely because of the interven-
ing bankruptcy of the debtor, unless there was some significantly
discernible benefit to the general creditors of the estate. The Su-
preme Court has unequivocally indicated that rearrangement of
state law priorities and property rights should not be lightly
undertaken:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
80. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); Lewis v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank,
364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961).
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interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interest
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to dis-
courage forum shopping and to prevent a party from receiving a "windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." 1
Certainly the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute between parties having competing interests in the property
of the debtor so as to expedite the liquidation and classification of
their claims. That is, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to ap-
ply state law to determine which party has priority. However, in
the absence of some significant residual benefit to general creditors
of the estate, there is obviously no reason sufficiently compelling to
justify the wholesale abandonment of state priority laws, based
solely upon what the trustee considers to be equitable grounds. If
the holding in Jackson Brewing Company were followed, secured
creditors could consistently avoid the application of state priority
laws, under which they have an inferior position to that of an op-
tionee, vendee or lessee, solely by reason of the intervening bank-
ruptcy of the owner of the secured property. Such a result has no
basis in existing law.
The issue has also been raised before the Second Circuit. In
Minges,82the trustee sought to reject a space lease of the debtor-
lessor's heavily mortgaged office building. Evoking the holding in
Jackson Brewing Company, the trustee justified his rejection upon
the fact that the rejection ultimately benefited secured creditors.
He had not undertaken to determine if there was any benefit to
the unsecured creditors of the estate resulting from the rejection.
The lessee objected, complaining that the sole effect of rejection
would be to benefit the mortgagees who, under applicable state
law, held interests which were subordinate to the leasehold interest
of the lessee. The court refused to affirm the trustee's rejection
and, instead, remanded the case for detailed findings on whether
the rejection benefited the general creditors. The court carefully
noted that an assumption by the bankruptcy court, that a rejection
which benefited secured creditors would also benefit general credi-
tors, was insufficient to justify rejection. 3
81. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
82. 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).
83. Id. at 44.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield was emphatic in
supporting the remand by the majority, stating in part:
[T]he standard governing the trustee should be whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that general creditors will derive any substantial or significant ben-
efit. If, for instance, the rejection would probably result in no benefit to gen-
eral creditors or in recovery of only a few dollars for distribution to general
creditors... and would result in the mortgagees gaining a windfall at the
expense of the lessee, the trustee should not have the power to reject. In the
latter case he would be acting as a pawn for the mortgagees, benefiting them
at the expense of the lessee, even though the mortgagees took their security
with notice of the burdens involved....
Although the court did not fully articulate the reasons for requir-
ing substantial benefit to unsecured creditors as a precondition to
rejection, Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion hints at the court's
recognition that the competing interest of secured creditors and
real property lessees should be left to resolution by state law un-
less the substantial benefit to unsecured creditors justifies rejection
and, consequently, the alteration of the priorities of the parties. As
Judge Mansfield points out, benefit to secured creditors may be a
permissible result of the decision to reject a lease, but it should not
serve as the motivation for rejection. 5
In summary, the guiding standard under the Code for rejec-
tion by the trustee should be that he may reject an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease when, in his business judgment, it is in the
best interest of the unsecured creditors of the estate to do so.
Where such rejection results in the alteration of existing state law
priorities among non-debtor parties, however, such benefit to un-
secured creditors must be found by the bankruptcy court to be real
and substantial.
II. PROBLEMS RELATING To AssuMPnoN OF LEASES
A. Right to Cure
Under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee succeeded to, and was
entitled to exercise, any existing rights of the debtor to cure a pre-
84. Id. at 44-45.
85. Several bankruptcy courts have indicated an adherence to the view that a lease may
be rejected only if the primary purpose of rejection is to benefit the general, unsecured
creditors of the estate. See, In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Summit Land Co., 13 Bankr. 310 (D. Utah 1981); In re Marina Enter. Inc., 14 Bankr. 327
(S.D. Fla. 1981).
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petition default.88 However, the trustee's ability to cure was en-
tirely dependent upon the existence of either (i) an express provi-
sion in the lease permitting the cure, or (ii) a comparable right to
cure granted under applicable state antiforfeiture laws. Failure to
comply with the cure provisions in a timely fashion, or the absence
of a contractual or statutory right to cure, left the trustee's at-
tempt at assumption subject to the other party's right to termi-
nate, even though the trustee was prepared to cure any defaults
and undertake performance of the lease.1
7
This created two serious problems for the trustee. First, to
preserve the right to assume the lease the trustee might have to act
with impracticable speed, and perhaps expend funds of the estate,
in order to cure the default within the time period specified in the
lease. Such action would have to be taken notwithstanding the fact
that it was far too early for the trustee to determine if assumption
was beneficial to the estate. Such an early "curing" of defaults
86. It was well settled under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act that any contractual
rights to cure lease defaults passed to the trustee under section 70a(5), and that the trustee
could exercise such rights to cure, and then assume, the lease. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a)(5) (1976)
(repealed 1978). See, Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part II, 57 MINN.
L. Rav. 439, 507 (1972).
87. It was clear under the Bankruptcy Act that the trustee acquired no greater rights to
cure lease defaults than the debtor had. Failure to cure in accordance with the lease left the
other party free to terminate the lease unless the trustee could take advantage of state anti-
forfeiture law. Good Hope Refineries, Inc., v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1979); In re
Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Commodity Merchants, Inc., 538
F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976). See also, 2 COLLIER (15th ed.) supra note 31, 1 365.04 at 365-28;
Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941).
There was some mediation of the harshness of this rule. In In re Lane Foods, 213 F.
Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), it was held that the court could temporarily stay repossession
following the lessor's termination, so as to provide the debtor with a reasonable time to
attempt to renegotiate the lease, find new premises, or otherwise undertake arrangements to
reduce the effects of radical dislocation. See also, In re Program Aids Co., 310 F. Supp. 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). As discussed in detail later in the text, several courts had refused to permit
termination pursuant to insolvency termination provisions when to do so would frustrate an
otherwise viable rehabilitation effort and would result in a windfall to the non-debtor. See
infra text accompanying notes 123-39. Also, in In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 520 F.2d 741 (10th
Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals refused to permit rescission of a land sales contract when
the debtor-vendee was in default but had made substantial installment payments which
would be forfeited if the contract could not be cured. The court, however, limited the in-
junction of termination to a reasonable period of time during which the trustee could deter-
mine whether it was worthwhile to defend the rescission on equitable grounds in state court.
The termination was stayed only for a reasonable period of time during which the trustee
could evaluate the propriety of assuming the lease and undertaking to prevent termination
under state law.
LEASE DISPOSITION IN BANKRUPTCY
would deprive the estate of funds needed for operation and, in the
event of subsequent rejection, might constitute a useless expendi-
ture of estate assets. Second, in those cases in which the trustee
could not comply with the cure provisions of the lease or the lease
contained no cure provisions, the non-debtor lessor was placed in a
powerful bargaining position. The lessor could demand renegoti-
ation of the terms of the lease as a condition to his waiver of his
absolute right to terminate.
1. Current Code Provisions. Section 365(b)(1) greatly broad-
ens the trustee's ability to cure and assume leases where there has
been a pre-petition default by the debtor or post-petition default
by the trustee. The Code recognizes that the real property or
equipment lease is often the sine qua non of the debtor's existence.
It is often essential, or at least helpful, to a viable rehabilitation
effort. In liquidation cases, the lease is often a valuable asset
which, if assumed and assigned by the trustee, may yield signifi-
cant cash for distribution to general creditors. Debtors, not sur-
prisingly, are often in default under the rental or other affirmative
covenants in the lease and the threat of eviction or termination
may be the motivating factor behind the filing of a petition. Sec-
tion 365(b) creates-in favor of the trustee-a statutory right to
cure which is independent of the lease or state law.88 Exercising
his independent cure rights under section 365(b), the trustee can
preserve his ability to assume a defaulted lease without being lim-
ited by the restrictiveness or absence of lease cure provisions. Fur-
thermore, the Code provides the trustee with an independent time
period in which to make his election to cure and to assume or re-
ject the lease.89 Thus, the trustee is relieved from undue pressure
in attempting to reach a rational determination of such essential
factors as the utility of the lease to a reorganization effort, the fea-
sibility of a proposed reorganization plan or, in a liquidation, the
assignable value of the lease.
The broadening of the trustee's ability to cure is purchased at
some sacrifice. Section 365(b)(1) provides:
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired
88. Sections 1123(a)(5)(G) and 1322(b)(3) also provide, respectively, that a plan in a
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 rehabilitation may provide for the "curing or waiving of any de-
fault." Such a plan provision would have to satisfy the requirements of section 365(b).
89. Section 365(d). See supra discussion accompanying notes 19-26.
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lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless,
at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee vill
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease,
for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such con-
tract or lease. 0
Section 365(b)(1) is mandatory, not permissive, and provides that
where there has been a default, the trustee cannot assume the
lease unless he cures such default in accordance with the extensive
requirements set forth in paragraphs A, B, and C. As the legislative
history indicates, this section creates a limitation upon the trus-
tee's ability to assume.91 It would seem that the trustee will have
to comply with the requirements of section 365(b)(1) regardless of
the fact that less stringent cure requirements are set forth in the
lease."2 However, it is difficult to conceive of the bankruptcy court
90. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982).
91. The Senate and House Reports commented:
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) provide limitations on the trustee's powers. Subsec-
tion (b) requires the trustee to cure any default in the contract or lease and to
provide adequate assurance of future performance if there has been a default,
before he may assume. This provision does not apply to ipso facto or bankruptcy
clauses which is a significant departure from present law.
See supra note 1, Senate Report at 58, House Report at 347.
92. Notwithstanding the exclusive and mandatory language of section 365(b)(1), section
108(b) of the Code apparently allows the trustee additional time to cure a lease default in
accordance with the lease terms. Section 108(b) provides that:
[If] an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor... may... cure a
default, or perform any other similar act, and such period has not expired before
the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may only ... cure or perform,
as the case may be, before the later of:
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on
or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
The sparse legislative history concerning this section indicates merely that it is derived from
section 11(e) of the Bankruptcy Act and permits the trustee an extension of time of up to 60
days to undertake certain beneficial actions on behalf of the debtor, including the curing of
a default. See supra note 1, Commission Report at 68, House Report at 318, Senate Report
at 58.
A strong argument can be made that the inclusion of this language in the Code was an
oversight. Section lle of the Bankruptcy Act provided a similar 60-day extension period for
the trustee. In view of the trustee's limited and dependent right under section 70b to cure
only in accordance with the terms of the lease, such an extended grace period was of para-
mount importance to the trustee. Unfortunately, in In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d
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applying the requirements of this section with equal stringency in
those cases where the trustee has succeeded to the debtor's right to
cure in accordance with the provisions of the lease, as compared to
those cases in which the ability to cure is created entirely by sec-
tion 365. As discussed below, 3 the court should in all cases, regard-
less of the presence or absence of cure provisions in the lease, ex-
amine the circumstances surrounding the trustee's assumption of
the lease to assure that such assumption does not deprive the non-
debtor of the benefit of his original bargain-an inquiry quite simi-
lar to the adequate assurances of future performance required by
section 365(b)(1)(C). However, where the trustee has succeeded to
a contractual right to cure the debtor's default, the requirement of
pecuniary compensation under section 365(b)(1)(B) and the re-
quirement of adequate assurance of future performance under sec-
tion 365 (b)(1)(C) should be applied only to assure that the lessor
has received the benefit of his bargain. It is doubtful that these
provisions should be rigidly applied in a manner which gives the
lessor greater rights than he had in his original lease with the
debtor.
The cure requirements of section 365(b)(1) are intriguingly
problematical. Paragraph A dictates that the trustee may not as-
sume the lease unless, at the time of assumption, the trustee
"cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure, such default." However, where the prior default
was one which the debtor was not entitled to cure under the lease
or applicable state law, or where such right has expired, how can a
171 (5th Cir. 1972), section lie was held to be inapplicable to the curing of a default under a
contract or lease of the debtor. The decision in Schokbeton effectively forced the trustee to
act with impractical speed in undertaking to cure a default within the grace period, in the
applicable contract or lease. The inclusion of section 108(b) in the Code was a clear legisla-
tive attempt to negate the Schokbeton interpretation of section 11(e) and allow an extension
of existing cure rights for up to 60 days following the order for relief. Section 108(b), how-
ever, originated in the Commission's and Judges' Bills, which did not contain the far
broader and independent statutory right to cure that is now found in section 365(b) of the
Code. See supra note 1, section 4-102(b), H.R. 31, H.R. 32, S. 235, S. 236. With the addition
of the cure provisions of section 365(b), there is no apparent need to extend any grace pe-
riod in the lease since the trustee can cure regardless of the time limitation contained in the
lease. In view of the clear language in section 365(b), that the trustee must comply with the
provisions of that section as a prerequisite to the trustee's assumption of a defaulted lease,
it would seem that the incompatible provisions of section 108(b) relating to the curing of
defaults may have been left in the Code by oversight.
93. See infra discussion accompanying notes 105-09.
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"cure" be effected? The answer, of course, is that the non-consen-
sual continuation of the lease constitutes a court imposed modifi-
cation of the lease, not a cure. When the parties have not provided
for a cure in their lease agreement, the continued effectiveness of
the lease following an incurable default is an undertaking which
was clearly not within the expectations of the parties at the time of
the lease bargain.
Such a de facto modification has some meager support in
traditional lease law in those cases where state courts, as a matter
of equity, have refused to permit a forfeiture when a lessee stands
ready to cure past due monetary payments and the allowance of a
termination would constitute the forfeiture of a large windfall to
the lessor. 4 There is also some support for de facto modification in
those pre-Code bankruptcy cases which prohibited termination
pursuant to "ipso facto" bankruptcy default clauses, when termi-
nation would defeat the rehabilitation effort and would result in a
windfall to the lessor. 5 However, it is a novel concept that the
trustee, with the approval of the court, can cure both monetary
and non-monetary defaults, in the absence of the express agree-
ment of the parties or compelling equitable considerations. The
right to cure under section 365 is, in effect, a right to rewrite the
provisions of the lease. Such an ability to modify unexpired leases
was unknown in kind or scope prior to enactment of the Code. The
extent of the inquiry which the court must undertake before ap-
proving such a cure and assumption should accordingly be an ex-
tensive one.
These concerns are, to some extent, expressly addressed by
sections 365(b)(1)(B) and (C). Section 365(b)(1)(B) specifically re-
quires that the court determine that the non-debtor has not, and
will not, suffer a measurable pecuniary loss as a result of a default
and cure. Of course, measurable pecuniary loss is not the sole harm
which might result from the trustee's cure and assumption of the
lease. A non-debtor lessor may have relied upon the credit-worthi-
ness, public identity, prestige, financial composition, product line,
management or other characteristics of the debtor in entering into
the original lease. Particularly in net or ground lease situations, the
94. See note, Bankruptcy Arrangements - Lease Forfeitures, 9 GA. L. REv. 288 (1974).
95. Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972); In re
Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964); Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Co.
v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974). See infra discussion accompanying notes 123-39.
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characteristics of the debtor may be important to the lessor's
financing plan, development obligations, plan for attracting other
tenants and maintenance arrangements. If the space is leased for
retail purposes, whether in a "shopping center" or otherwise, the
identity of the debtor may have essential significance with regard
to the tenant mix, percentage rents, operating and reciprocal
agreements, and other intangible aspects of the lease bargain
which may not have been expressed in the lease. Cure and assump-
tion by the trustee, and later assignment to a third party, may
have significant impact upon these aspects of the lease bargain.
These interests are addressed by section 365(b)(1)(C) of the Code.
The "adequate assurance of future performance" requirements
of section 365(b)(1)(C) apparently oblige the court to extend a
watchful eye to the non-pecuniary and less easily measurable as-
pects of the lease bargain so as to assure that the non-consensual
continuation of the lease does not represent a material devia-
tion-pecuniary, expectative or otherwise-from the parties origi-
nal bargain. 6 The requirement of adequate assurance of future
performance was first proposed in the Commission Bill with regard
to the cure and assumption of executory contracts (but not leases)
under which the debtor had defaulted."' The Commission Report
indicated that the phrase was adapted from Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-609(1). 9a The Commission Report also referred spe-
cifically to that section's official comment 4 and added cautiously,
"It is not intended, however, that any non-debtor party should ac-
quire greater rights in a case under the Act than he has outside the
96. Adequate assurance of future performance is required only if there has been a de-
fault under the lease. Section 365(f), however, requires adequate assurance of future per-
formance by a proposed assignee as a precondition to effective assignment by the trustee,
regardless of the absence of prior defaults.
97. Section 4-602(b)(2) of the Commission Bill, supra note 1. Some commentators have
asserted that the reason for excluding leases from the trustee's obligation to provide ade-
quate assurance of future performance was the Commission's stance that the commercial
realities surrounding executory contracts require adequate assurance of future performance,
while those coincident to a lease do not, so long as past monetary rent defaults are satisfied.
Albenda & Lief, Net Lease Financing Transactions Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of
1973, 30 Bus. LAw. 713 (1975). As the authors strenuously assert, the commercial realities
attending modern high credit net lease transactions also require substantial assurances that
future performance will not vary substantially from that originally contemplated by the
lease parties. The distinction contained in the Commission Bill was, of course, eliminated in
the subsequent House and Senate Bills.
98. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 156.
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Act." 99 U.C.C. section 2-609(1) provides in pertinent part: "A con-
tract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's
expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
When reasonable grounds for insecurity arises with respect to the
performance of either party the other party may in writing de-
mand adequate assurance of due performance .... 100 The official
comments then explain:
[A] continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised performance
will be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of the bargain. If ei-
ther the willingness or ability of a party to perform declines materially be-
tween the time of contracting and the time for performance the other party is
threatened with a loss of a substantial part of what he bargained for. 1 '
No specific standards are prescribed by the U.C.C. as to the form
or nature of adequate assurance but it is clear that adequate assur-
ance is to be determined by commercial, not legal, standards.
10 2
The official comments are extremely vague in describing what
might constitute adequate assurance. Examples are offered, rang-
ing from a mere declaration by a party of high reputation to the
opposite extreme of requiring the posting of security.1 0 3 The un-
derlying rationale of section 2-609(1) is perhaps best expressed in
official comment 1 quoted above: The expectation of future per-
formance is often a material aspect of the contract, entitled to sat-
isfaction as a condition to the continued validity of the
agreement.104
Some indication of the extent of the inquiry to be conducted
by the bankruptcy court in determining whether a lessor is ade-
quately assured of future performance is found in section
365(b)(3). That section prescribes minimal standards for determi-
nation of adequate assurance of future performance when the lease
being cured is a shopping center lease. Section 365(b)(3) provides:
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this section, adequate assurance
of future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center in-
99. Id. at 157.
100. U.C.C. § 2-609(1). Section 2-609(1) permits parties to suspend their own perform-
ance and demand adequate assurance of future performance, when reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to performance by the other party.
101. Id., official comment 1.
102. Id., § 2-609(2) which states: "[T]he adequacy of assurance shall be determined
according to commercial standards."
103. Id., official comment 4.
104. Id., official comment 1.
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cludes adequate assurance -
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease;0 5
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline
substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not breach substan-
tially any provision, such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, in
any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such
shopping center;' 6 and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt sub-
stantially any tenant mix or balance in such shopping center.
These provisions were the product of a lingering concern that the
curative powers granted to the trustee in section 365 might result
in compelling the non-debtor to accede to an agreement to which
the non-debtor had never actually agreed. The House Report ex-
horted a warning that:
[T]he courts will have to insure that the trustee's performance under the con-
tract or lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.
An example of the complexity that may arise in these situations and the need
for a determination of all aspects of a particular executory contract or
unexpired lease is the shopping center lease ....
... [I]n order to assure a landlord of his bargained for exchange, the
court would have to consider such factors as the nature of the business to be
conducted by the trustee or his assignee, whether that business complies with
the requirements of any master agreement, whether the kind of business pro-
posed will generate gross sales in an amount such that the percentage rent
specified in the lease is substantially the same... and whether the business
proposed to be conducted would result in a breach of other clauses in master
agreements relating, for example, to tenant mix and location.es (emphasis
added)
The Congressional intent manifested in this language and in the
Code is unequivocal. The court must go well beyond the confines
105. The category of "other consideration" indicates a congressional recognition that
the tenant's covenants concerning performance of maintenance, construction, operation, tax
and insurance payments and other obligations are integrally related to the "consideration"
which the lessor receives, and that such consideration is not necessarily limited to the rental
specified in the lease.
106. In addition to the lessors other lease agreements, the broad language of this sec-
tion apparently covers all of the non-debtor's other lease agreements concerning the shop-
ping center, including reciprocal operation agreements, management agreements, underlying
ground leases, urban redevelopment agreements, mortgage obligations and developer agree-
ments with local municipalities. Together with the requirement of section 365(b)(3)(D) that
the court consider the "tenant mix" of the shopping center, the Code requires the court to
consider almost any external factor which indicates that the cure or subsequent assignment
by the trustee might adversely affect the position of the lessor.
107. House Report, supra note 1, at 348-49.
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of the lease and examine the commercial context of the lease
transaction.
The non-exclusive language of section 365(b)(3) lists many of
the commercial considerations which may have influenced the
landlord in his original transaction with the debtor. The self-maxi-
mizing, rational shopping center landlord often has a well-planned
and elaborate financing and development scheme which may be re-
flected in complex ground lease agreements, development agree-
ments, financing agreements, land use agreements, operating
agreements, and private restrictive use agreements. The decision to
enter into a lease with the debtor may have been influenced by
these external, but important, commercial matters relating to the
financing and developing scheme of the landlord. However, the
commercial context of the original lease transaction is not identifi-
able solely from the express agreements of the landlord. In enter-
ing into the lease there may have been legitimate reliance by the
lessor upon the credit rating of the tenant, the customer drawing
power of the tenant, the quality of the tenant's product, the stabil-
ity and management of the tenant, and other intangible factors.
The warning contained in the House Report appears to be equally
applicable to these commercial concerns-the court must review
the cure or assignment carefully to assure that these factors will
not be affected in a way which might deprive the landlord of the
landlord's original bargain with the debtor.
It is possible to limit the extensive inquiry required by section
365(b)(3) only to shopping center leases. However, the same con-
siderations which impel the inclusion of section 365(b)(3) equally
compel a similar inquiry in any lease assumption or assignment. As
the statements in the House Report indicate, the considerations
listed in section 365(b)(3) are responsive to the "complexity" that
may arise in examining a particular lease and the need for a "de-
termination of all aspects" of the lease bargain. There is nothing in
the Code or legislative history to indicate that the extensive in-
quiry required by section 365(b)(3) was intended to be limited to
shopping center leases.10 Many landlords of non-shopping center
108. The legislative history of section 365(b)(3) is somewhat confusing. The Senate Bill
contained provisions substantially similar to section 365(b)(3), but which applied to all
leases. See section 365(b)(5) of S. 2266, supra note 1. The House Bill, supra note 1, con-
tained no comparable provision, leaving determination of adequate assurance of future per-
formance to judicial development. The current language of section 365(b)(3) first appeared
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office or retail space also have extensive financing, development,
and private agreements which may have impacted upon the deci-
sion to enter into a lease with the debtor. Also, the particular
financial or other characteristics of the debtor may have signifi-
cantly influenced the landlord in entering into the lease. The test
for adequate assurance of future performance would appear to be
the same for these non-shopping center leases-the court must in-
quire into the commercial context which existed at the time of exe-
cution to determine whether assumption or assignment would de-
prive the non-debtor of a material aspect of his bargain with the
debtor. 109
2. Lease Provisions Expressing the Agreement of the Par-
ties. What approach should a bankruptcy court take when engag-
ing in a review under section 365(b)(1) if the parties have carefully
included detailed and restrictive cure provisions, or restrictive as-
signment provisions in the lease? By expressing the specific condi-
tions for the debtor's cure of a default, or for the assignment of the
lease, the parties have indicated the parameters of their original
in the final compromise bill just prior to enactment of the Code. The Senate and House
Debates on the compromise bill enactment indicated only that:
Section 365(b)(3) represents a compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by the
House and the Senate Amendment. The provision adopts standards contained in
section 365(b)(5) of the Senate Amendment to define adequate assurance of fu-
ture performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center.
124 CONG. REC. S17,409 (1978); 124 CONG. Rc. H11,093 (1978). The non-exclusive language
of section 365(b)(3) reflects the Senate's original intention to use the type of judicial inquir-
ies required for shopping center leases as indicative of the types of considerations which the
court should undertake before approving a cure and assumption of any lease. Indeed, the
Senate Report had clearly indicated the exemplary nature of the provision:
Subsection (b)(5) provides that in lease situations common to shopping centers
protection must be provided for the lessor if the trustee assumes the lease, in-
cluding protection against decline in percentage rents, breach of agreements
with other tenants, and preservation of the tenant mix. Protection for tenant
mix will not be required in the office building situation. (emphasis added)
The change from the Senate Bill to the current provisions of section 365(b)(3) can be seen
as merely clarifying the fact that many of the specific provisions in the former Senate Bill
were meant to apply primarily M shopping center situations.
109. Several bankruptcy courts have engaged in inquiring into the initial bargain of the
parties to determine if assumption and assignment constitute a material deviation from the
original bargain of the parties. See In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 20 Bankr. 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re U.L. Radio Corp., 19 Bankr. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Executive Square
Office Bldg. v. O'Connor, 19 Bankr. 143 (N.D. Fla. 1981); In re Boogaart of Florida, Inc., 17
Bankr. 480 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Lafayette Elec. Corp., 12 Bankr. 302 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); In
re Sapolin Paints, 5 Bankr. 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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expectations regarding the non-debtor's obligation to continue per-
forming in the event of a default or assignment by the debtor. Any
variation from the provisions of the lease would be an apparent
denial of the original bargain of the parties.
Restrictions in the lease intended to directly "prohibit, restrict
or condition" assignment or assumption are expressly invalid
under the Code.110 But it is unclear under the Code whether the
court may disregard those provisions in the lease which indirectly,
but effectively, prohibit or restrict assignment or assumption by
imposing severe use, cure, or other conditions as a prerequisite to
continued lease validity. For example, the parties may have im-
posed as a prerequisite to the debtor's cure of a default that the
debtor post additional security, establish additional tax and insur-
ance escrows, pay penalties or interest, or provide guarantees. Sim-
ilarly, the lease may include indirect restrictions in the form of use
restrictions or requirements that the debtor maintain a certain
financial composition. Is the bankruptcy court bound to require
compliance with such provisions by the trustee or assignee?
Resolution of this question is extremely important. If the
court respects the cure, use, or financial composition provisions of
the lease, intelligent draftsmen would soon emasculate section
365(b) by including highly restrictive conditions in the lease. On
the other hand, the provisions may manifest the legitimate expec-
tations of the parties.
The proper course for the court is, of course, to engage in an
independent inquiry of these provisions in an attempt to identify
the actual, commercially legitimate, agreement of the parties. For
instance, in In re U. L. Radio Corp.,""' the bankruptcy court inval-
idated a use restriction on the basis that the primary function of
the restriction was to impede assumption and assignment rather
than to preserve some justifiable commercial interest of the lessor.
Despite the unequivocal restriction that the premises be used as a
television sales and service retail store, the court permitted assign-
110. Section 365(0 invalidates contract or lease provisions which "prohibit, restrict or
condition" the assignment of the contract or lease. There are two exceptions to the invalida-
tion. Section 365(c)(1) specifically excludes from assumption or assignment all "personal
service" contracts or leases if applicable state law would excuse delivery or acceptance of
performance by the non-debtor. Also, section 365(c)(2) exempts executory loan commit-
ments from assumption or assignment.
111. 19 Bankr. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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ment of the lease to a small delicatessen, finding that the building
in which the premises were located already housed a restaurant,
laundry, and liquor store. The court stated that there is a "clear
Congressional policy" favoring assumption and assignment, and
added: "To prevent an assignment of an unexpired lease by de-
manding strict enforcement of a use clause, and thereby contradict
clear Congressional policy, a landlord or lessor must show that ac-
tual and substantial detriment would be incurred by him if the
deviation in use was permitted." '112
As the court properly emphasized, any lease provision which
has an anti-assumption or anti-assignment effect must be carefully
scrutinized to determine whether its sole effect is to limit assump-
tion or assignment or whether the provision serves some legitimate
interest of the non-debtor. In other words, the use restriction could
not be used solely to block assumption and assignment of the
lease. The non-debtor must show some legitimate commercial jus-
tification for inclusion of such restrictive provisions.
B. Insolvency Termination Provisions
Insolvency termination provisions, commonly known as "ipso
facto"11 3 clauses, began to frequently appear in leases after the
1934 Supreme Court decision in Irving Trust Co. v. Perry.11 4 Prior
to that case, an anomalous situation existed under the Bankruptcy
Act with regard to landlords' claims for unpaid future rentals. Sec-
tion 63(a)(1)' 15 of the Bankruptcy Act restricted "provability" of
112. Id. at 544.
113. The terms "ipso facto clause" or "ipso facto provision" have commonly been ap-
plied to a broad variety of lease clauses which provide for the automatic or optional termi-
nation of a lease upon the bankruptcy, insolvency, or other change in financial condition of
one of the parties. The contents of lease termination clauses are virtually limitless in vari-
ety. Generally, they permit one party to terminate a lease based upon the other party's
insolvency, insolvency-related acts (such as appointment of a receiver), change in financial
condition, change in composition or ownership, decrease in gross sales, filing of a voluntary
or involuntary petition in bankruptcy, or such other reasons as the draftsman may establish.
The term "ipso facto" was originally used to refer to those lease covenants which provided
that the lease terminated instantly, or "ipso facto" upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition
by one of the parties. Herein the term "insolvency termination provision" will often be used
to refer generally to any provision, automatic or optional, which is intended to allow a party
to a lease to terminate or modify the lease upon the happening of an insolvency-related
event or a change in the composition or financial position of the other party. The historical
reason for inclusion of an instantaneous termination provision is explained in the text.
114. 293 U.S. 307 (1934).
115. 30 Stat. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1926).
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claims to those which were "absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition."""6 The courts regularly held that claims for
unpaid future rental became "absolutely owing" only as each
rental payment became due under the lease.117 The result was
often unfair to the lessor if the debtor was a corporation, and dis-
astrous to the debtor if the debtor was an individual. Non-provable
claims could not serve as a basis for participation in distribution of
the debtor's estate. If the debtor was a corporation, the lessor was
excluded from distribution and then left with only an assetless cor-
poration from which to seek its outstanding claim. On the other
hand, non-provable claims were not discharged by bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, leaving debtor-individuals saddled with large, undis-
charged debts.
Stubbornly, courts refused to allow lessors a provable claim for
unpaid future rent even in those circumstances in which the land-
lord had expressly reserved the option, upon filing of a bankruptcy
petition, to terminate the lease and recover damages in accordance
with a formula set forth in the lease.118 The courts reasoned that
the claim arising from enforcement of such an optional termination
and damage covenant was not "absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition." 1 9 In response to this reasoning, the landlord
116. See Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944). The subject of
provability of a landlord's claim for future rental was the center of voluminous writing in
1933-34. An excellent and complete collection of authorities and discussion of the non-prov-
ability of landlord's claims in bankruptcy can be found in Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent
Claims in Bankruptcy, 33 COLUM. L. RaV. 213 (1933). See, e.g., Radin, Claims for Unac-
crued Rent in Bankruptcy, 21 CALIF. L. REv. 561 (1933); Fallon, Lessors as Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 4 BROOKLYN L. REV. 11 (1934); Note, Provability of Landlord's Claim in Bank-
ruptcy, 44 YALE L.J. 670 (1935); Note, The Provability of Future Rent Claims in Bank-
ruptcy, 47 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1934).
117. Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 (1918). See also the authorities listed supra
note 116.
118. In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667 (2d Cir. 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 F. 410 (1st
Cir. 1910); In re Goldberg, 52 F.2d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Hubbard, 57 F.2d 213
(W.D.N.Y. 1932).
The resistance of the courts to the allowance of a provable claim in favor of landlords was
motivated by the disproportionally high amount of the landlord's claim for future damages,
particularly if the unexpired term of the lease was substantial. Full allowance of the land-
lord's claim would result in a substantial diminution of the pro-rata distribution to other
general creditors. In view of the additional fact that the landlord was regaining his original
asset, the reluctance of the courts is understandable. Unfortunately, this all or nothing ap-
proach to allowance of landlord's claims often left landlords with exactly that-all (burden-
ing the bankrupt with a non-dischargable debt) or nothing.
119. In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667 (2d Cir. 1910).
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in Irving Trust Co. provided in its lease with the debtor that the
filing of a bankruptcy petition would, ipso facto, result in a termi-
nation of the lease and would automatically give rise to a damage
claim amounting to the difference between the rent reserved in the
lease and the projected fair market rental value at the time of ter-
mination. The Supreme Court agreed such a covenant gave rise to
a provable claim for future damages arising from the post-petition
termination of the lease. At last, lessors had managed to assure
distribution from the estates of bankrupt corporate lessees and,
not surprisingly, the proliferation of ipso facto provisions was
quick to follow.
120
The enforceability of ipso facto provisions was embraced as
statutory law by the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. 21
Section 70b was modified to provide that "an express covenant
that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a
specified party thereto or of either party shall terminate the lease
or give the other party an election to terminate the same is en-
forceable."1 22 Unfortunately, in providing landlords with provable
claims, the courts, and then the Congress, elevated landlords to an
extremely powerful and unfair position vis-a-vis the general credi-
tors, especially in rehabilitation cases. By exercising its option to
terminate the lease, the lessor could deprive the estate of an asset
essential to a successful rehabilitation, even though continuation of
the lease would provide no measurable harm to the lessor and de-
spite the eagerness of the trustee to assume the lease and perform
thereunder. Even in liquidation cases, this result was obviously un-
fair. Any value in the leasehold occasioned by the difference be-
tween the rent reserved and current market rates, would be sacri-
ficed to a single creditor, the lessor, rather than distributed
proportionally to all of the general creditors of the estate. This was
so notwithstanding the absence of any prejudice to the lessor re-
120. A statutory compromise to the problem of landlords' claims was enacted in 1934.
Section 63(a) was modified to make claims for future rental provable and allowable but only
to the extent of an amount not greater than the rent reserved in the lease for one year
following surrender of the premises. 48 Stat. 923 (1934). Thus, while landlords were ex-
pressly permitted to participate in distribution of the estate, the estate was protected from
excessive claims for future rents.
121. 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
122. 52 Stat. 880-81, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). In Finn v. Meighan, 325
U.S. 300, 302 (1945), the Court recognized that the enactment of section 70b in 1938 was
"merely declaratory of the law as it then existed."
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sulting from continuation of the lease. The frequent result was a
windfall to the lessor and grievous harm to the general creditors. It
seems that the origin of ipso facto clauses as a mere mechanism to
enable lessors to participate in estate distribution was lost. Insol-
vency termination provisions were routinely and unquestioningly
enforced.
A limited judicial departure from the strict enforcement of
ipso facto clauses arose in 1945 with the decision of the Supreme
Court in Smith v. Hoboken Railroad, Warehouse and Steamship
Connecting Co. 2' In Smith, the debtor-railroad sought reorganiza-
tion under.section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.124 The debtor had
leased substantially all of its assets and, consequently, a forfeiture
of the leasehold to the lessor would almost certainly have made
reorganization impossible. The Supreme Court refused to allow a
post-petition termination, notwithstanding the unequivocal lan-
guage of an insolvency-termination provision contained in the
lease. The Court distinguished earlier cases enforcing insolvency-
termination provisions on the basis that, in section 77 proceedings,
special authority is granted to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to prepare a plan compatible with the public interest. In view
of the clear Congressional concern for the interests of the public in
railroad reorganizations, and the express duty imposed upon the
I.C.C. to create a plan in furtherance of that public interest, the
ability of the lessor to terminate the lease would have to yield.
Thus, at least where enforcement of termination clauses would in-
hibit or destroy the ability of the I.C.C. to formulate a plan in fur-
therance of the public interest, insolvency termination provisions
would not readily be enforced.
Despite this crack in the rigid enforcement of termination pro-
visions, it was over twenty years before the public interest ration-
ale of Smith was applied in a context other than section 77 rail-
road reorganizations. In two factually similar Chapter X cases,
Weaver v. Hutson"25 and In re Fleetwood Hotel Corp.,"6 the
Fourth and Third Circuits, respectively, refused to allow termina-
tion where the corporate debtors were ground-lessees that had con-
structed extensive hotel improvements upon their ground-leased
123. 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978).
125. 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972).
126. 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
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land. In both cases, the stock of the debtors was publicly traded
and there was substantial equity in the leasehold 127-equity which
would be sacrificed in a windfall to the lessors if termination was
allowed. Both circuit courts confirmed that the bankruptcy courts
had inherent equitable discretion to enjoin termination in view of
the compelling circumstances favoring the continuation of the
leases.
The courts listed three essential factors justifying their refusal
to enforce the insolvency termination provisions contained in the
ground leases, despite the clear language of section 70b: (i) the in-
ability of the respective debtors to formulate a plan of reorganiza-
tion without the leased premises; (ii) the large, perhaps uncon-
scionable, windfall that would accrue to the lessors in the event of
termination, at the expense of general creditors and equity holders;
and (iii) the obligation in Chapter X proceedings to protect the
investments of public shareholders of the debtor and the involve-
ment of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
128
Although both courts relied heavily upon the public interest
rationale of Smith, it is likely that they were motivated largely by
the unjustifiable windfall to the lessors and the enormous loss to
the general creditors and equity holders who, upon termination of
the lease, would receive little, if any, distribution from the result-
ing liquidation. On the other hand, continuation of the leases
would not only prevent a forfeiture of the debtors' equity but
would enable the general creditors and equity holders to agree to a
reorganization plan which, if successful, would substantially en-
hance the percentage repayment of their claims. To allow lease ter-
mination under such circumstances would be unconscionable.
It was not surprising that, eventually, the public interest ra-
tionale of Smith would be abandoned under circumstances where
it was clear that termination would result in an unconscionable,
and unnecessary, forfeiture. In Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor
Co. v. Blum, 29 a Chapter XI arrangement, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit refused to permit post-petition, insolvency-
127. In Weaver, the debtor's equity in the hotel improvements was $1,000,000. In
Fleetwood, the value of the hotel and improvements was estimated by the referee to be
approximately $1,400,000, with secured mortgage and chattel debt estimated at about
$731,000.
128. See Weaver, 459 F.2d at 743.44; see also Fleetwood Hotel, 335 F.2d at 862.
129. 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974).
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related termination of the debtor's lease under far less compelling
circumstances than those in either Weaver or Fleetwood Hotel.
The lease was a simple retail space lease of premises used by the
debtor for purposes of operating its sole business, a liquor store.
No building had been constructed by the debtor nor was the
debtor a publicly-held corporation. It was the location, rather than
the particular structure or tenant improvements, which was essen-
tial to the rehabilative effort. Nevertheless, the court noted several
factors justifying its holding: (i) the interests of unsecured credi-
tors were not dissimilar to those of the public in Chapter X cases;
and (ii) that termination would result primarily in a windfall to the
lessor in the form of a higher rental, while destroying any chances
for the successful rehabilitation of the debtor.130 It was quite clear
in Queens Boulevard that the lessor was exercising its right to ter-
minate the lease not because of any insecurity or prejudice arising
from the debtor's bankruptcy but solely to re-rent the property to
a prospective tenant.
Queens Boulevard established that the bankruptcy court had
wide discretion to exercise its equitable powers to protect the in-
terests of general creditors "when continuation of the lease would
render an otherwise promising arrangement under Chapter XI im-
possible." 131 Numerous cases applied the equity balancing test of
Queens Boulevard with fairly consistent outcomes. If the debtor
had substantial equity in the improvements, if a substantial por-
tion of the lease term was unexpired, if there were extensive tenant
or ground-lease improvements, or if the lease could be continued
without substantial prejudice to the lessor, courts evidenced a will-
ingness to prohibit post-petition termination.1 3 2
130. Id. at 206-07.
131. Id. at 207. Accord, In re Huntington, Ltd., 654 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981); In re
Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975); In re M & M Transp. Co., 437 F.
Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Delta Hotel, Inc., 10 Bankr. 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). See also
In re Triangle Laboratories, Inc., 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).
132. See, e.g., In re Huntington, Ltd., 654 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981) (termination of the
50-year ground lease was prohibited when the term was substantially unexpired, the termi-
nation would result in a forfeiture of improvements and there was little prejudice to the
lessor in continuing the lease); In re Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.
1975) (termination prohibited when reoganization would not be possible if lease was termi-
nated and termination would result in forfeiture of extensive hotel buildings, furniture and
equipment); In re M & M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (termination of an
equipment lease containing an option to purchase was prohibited where the debtor was cur-
rent in rental payments, the security was not impaired and a substantial equity would be
[Vol. 32
LEASE DISPOSITION IN BANKRUPTCY
On the other hand, there was a clear indication from the
courts that relief would be granted only if there were compelling
equitable circumstances sufficient to counterbalance the mandate
of section 70b. Termination was permitted in those cases where the
feasibility of the proposed reorganization plan was in doubt 133 or
where the debtor could not show that the lease was essential to the
reorganization plan.134 Similarily, when the debtor had a history of
defaults or other improper conduct, the courts refused to exercise
their equitable powers to prevent post-petition termination. 13 5
Some courts simply refused to entertain a plea for preventing ter-
mination unless the debtor could clearly show the existence of sub-
stantial injustices arising from the termination. 36
From the abundant progeny of Queens Boulevard, there began
to emerge a clear articulation of the considerations which the
bankruptcy court should weigh in determining whether or not to
permit post-petition lease termination. One bankruptcy court co-
gently listed the factors which would support an order prohibiting
termination:
(1) a termination of the lease would terminate the business of the
defendant;
(2) a public interest in the business of the defendant would be lost;
(3) a public investment in the stock of the defendant would be lost;
(4) a termination of the leases would not save the landlord from any in-
jury but only provide him the opportunity to obtain a higher rent or to ac-
quire improvements or fixtures and equipment of the defendant;
(5) a history of prompt rental payment by the defendant and a large
security deposit held by the landlord to secure defendant's obligations under
the lease suggest unfairness to the lessee if the lease is terminated.
137
forfeited by termination); In re Delta Hotel, Inc., 10 Bankr. 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (termina-
tion of a ground lease was prohibited when the term was substantially unexpired, there
would be a staggering forfeiture of equity in the improvements if terminated, there was little
prejudice to lessors resulting from continuation of the lease, and a failure to continue the
lease would result in a conversion of the case to liquidation with no dividend to unsecured
creditors).
133. In re D.H. Overmyer Co., 383 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 510 F.2d 329 (2d
Cir. 1975).
134. In re Hough Mfg. Corp., 1 Bankr. 69 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
135. In re GSVC Restaurant Corp., 3 Bankr. 491 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 10 Bankr. 300
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
136. In re Acorn Inv., 8 Bankr. 506 (S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Mimi's of Atlanta, Inc., 5
Bankr. 623 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd and remanded, 11 Bankr. 710 (N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Joyce
Leslie, Inc., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Gilchrest Co., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
1094 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
137. In re Hough Mfg. Corp., 1 Bankr. 69, 73 (W.D. Wis. 1979).-
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It is quite interesting that in at least two cases, post-petition
termination was prohibited where the leases were not necessary to
an effective reorganization. In In re Huntington, Ltd.,138 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals prohibited termination of a long-term
ground lease, even though the unequivocal intention of the trustee
was to assign the lease and use the profits to help fund the Chap-
ter XI arrangement. In view of the substantial forfeiture of im-
provements and the windfall to the lessor, the court concluded that
the value of the lease should be preserved for the general creditors
of the estate. Similarily, in In re M & M Transportation Co.,139 it
was held that the bankruptcy court properly enjoined an equip-
ment lessor from terminating an equipment lease even though the
sole reason for continuing the lease was to permit the trustee to
exercise an option to purchase the equipment under the lease, sell
the equipment and use the proceeds to support the arrangement.
The court emphasized that the security was not impaired by a con-
tinuation of the lease and the payments under the lease were cur-
rent. Under such conditions, it would be substantially unjust to
terminate the lease and deprive the general creditors of the estate
of the value of the leasehold while allowing a windfall to the lessor.
The rationale of these cases is clearly correct. Regardless of
the nature of the bankruptcy proceeding, the impetus behind the
decisions in Smith, Weaver, Fleetwood Motel, and Queens
Boulevard is the inherent injustice in allowing any value in the
leasehold to be forfeited to the lessor. In a reorganization case, the
purpose behind continuing the lease is so that the trustee can then
assign that lease to a reorganized debtor. The value of the lease-
hold is thereby preserved for the general creditors, and perhaps
the equity holders, who share in its value according to the distribu-
tion scheme specified in the reorganization plan. The logic which
compels continuation of the lease in a reorganization case is
equally applicable to a liquidation. So long as the lessor can be
protected from harm, any substantial value in the leasehold should
be preserved for the general creditors, who share in its value in
accordance with the distribution scheme specified in the liquida-
tion provisions of Chapter 7. When the new Code was enacted, this
emerging judicial doctrine was codified in sections 365(b)(2) and
138. 654 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. 437 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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365(e)(1).
C. Insolvency Termination Provisions and Section
365(e)-Standards of Application
The problem to which Queens Boulevard and its progeny were
directed-the post-petition termination of leases-is now effec-
tively, although somewhat indirectly, resolved by sections
365(b)(2)140 and 365(e)(1)1 4 1 of the Code. Under the Code, non-
consensual, post-petition lease termination by the lessor cannot oc-
cur regardless of the nature of the default. Section 365(e)(1) bars
insolvency-related terminations after filing of the petition. Section
140. Section 365(b)(2) states:
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a
provision relating to-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement.
141. Section 365(e)(1) states:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in
applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not
be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement
of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is condi-
tioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement.
Section 365(e)(1) does not apply to personal service contracts, or leases which contain per-
sonal service covenants. Also, section 365(c) prohibits the trustee from unilaterally assuming
executory contracts or leases when applicable state law excuses the other party from ac-
cepting performance from, or rendering performance to, an assignee. These sections also
prohibit the non-consensual assumption of loan commitments and letters of credit. See
supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 59, and HOUSE REPORT at 348. The prohibition of the trus-
tee's non-consensual assumption of such personal service contracts or leases is redundantly
repeated in section 365(e)(2). The repetition is unnecessary unless one assumes that the
non-debtor could not terminate his agreement even though the trustee cannot assume and
assign it under section 365(c). Such a situation would certainly be anomalous.
The provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C of section 365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) are identical
and describe the types of insolvency-related termination provisions which will not be en-
forced under the Code. The provisions are so broad in scope as to preclude even the most
inventive attempts of lease draftsmen to circumvent the prohibition of insolvency-related
lease termination provisions.
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362(a) automatically stays lease terminations based upon any other
type of default while the trustee decides either to cure the default
under section 365(b) or to reject the lease.142 Perhaps redundantly,
section 365(b)(2) exempts the trustee from having to satisfy the
cure requirements of section 365(b) if there has been an insol-
vency-related "default." These sections apply equally in liquida-
tion and reorganization cases, resulting in a reversal of the position
of the parties from that which existed under section 70b.1 3 The
trustee is now free to ignore any insolvency termination provisions,
while the aggrieved lessor is left to appeal to the equitable powers
of the bankruptcy court to prevent injustice or abuse.
From the lessor's point of view, the unenforceability of the in-
solvency termination provision may occasionally be an unforeseen
and unjustifiable modification of the original lease transaction. The
stability of the debtor's financial condition and/or composition
may have been a significant factor in the decision to engage in a
142. 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1982). The automatic stay is a debtor protection provision. It
stays all collection efforts, harassment and foreclosure actions in order to relieve the debtor
of financial pressures while he attempts repayment or reorganization.
A significant problem arises when the non-debtor has terminated the lease prior to the filing
of a bankruptcy petition, based upon an insolvency-related default. Section 365(a) is ex-
pressly limited to "unexpired" leases. Consequently, sections 365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) should,
it appears, be limited to those situations where only a default has occurred and the lease has
not been terminated under state law at the time of the petition. See 2 COLLIER (15th ed.),
supra note 31, 365.02 at 365.13. The legitimacy of this viewpoint is discussed in great
detail later in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 149-63.
143. Section 365(b)(2) represents a significant compromise between the Senate Bill and
the House Bill. The Senate Bill specified that insolvency termination provisions would con-
tinue to be applicable in liquidation proceedings and other limited circumstances. Section
365 of the Senate Bill stated:
The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not prevent termination
of a lease pursuant to provisions contained therein:
(A) in a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) where the lease was entered into before the effective date of this title;
(C) where the property leased thereunder is not essential to the debtor's
business;
(D) where the rent payable pursuant to the lease is substantially less than the
fair market value of the property leased thereunder; or
(E) where the lease contains provisions for rent contingent upon the lessee's
profits on sales and the rent otherwise set forth in the lease was substantially
less than the fair rental value of the property at the time the lease was entered
into.
Early versions of the House Bill also permitted insolvency-related termination in liquidation
cases. See section 4-602(b)(1). H.R. 31, supra note 1. The above-quoted provisions of the
Senate Bill were deleted, without comment, from the final version of the Code.
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lease with the debtor. It is important to recognize that the reasons
behind the inclusion of such termination clauses may include legit-
imate commercial considerations. When prohibiting termination
pursuant to section 365(e), the courts must be careful lest they
abandon the rationale of Queens Boulevard.
The judicial motivation behind Queens Boulevard was the un-
fairness of permitting a windfall to the lessor merely by virtue of
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The essence of the logic in
Queens Boulevard and its progeny was that the bankruptcy courts
are courts of equity and cannot blindly ignore the impact of a for-
malistic application of statutory bankruptcy provisions.4 Al-
though it is clear that the function of section 365(e)(1) is to pre-
serve the value of the leasehold for the general creditors of the
estate, the courts must be careful that permitting the trustee to
take advantage of any value in the leasehold does not unduly upset
the legitimate expectations of the lessor.
The Senate and House Reports provide strong support for
careful judicial scrutiny:
The unenforceability of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this
section will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of the non-debtor
party to executory contracts or unexpired leases... . [T]he courts will have
to insure that the trustee's performance under the contract or lease gives the
other contracting party the benefit of his bargain.
45
There is another, perhaps more compelling reason for the
court to closely examine the parties' intentions in including an in-
solvency termination provision in the lease. It may be necessary in
some cases for the court to issue an order modifying the termina-
tion provision or otherwise prohibiting its post-confirmation en-
forcement. In the absence of such court action, the prohibition
contained in sections 365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) will be of little prac-
tical effect. These provisions only toll the enforcement of insol-
vency termination provisions. By their terms, they do not prohibit
enforcement of insolvency termination provisions when they are
triggered after the closing of the case. The temporary nature of the
prohibition is clearly set forth in the express provisions of the
144. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). As the Supreme Court noted, bank-
ruptcy courts are courts of equity and their purposes have been invoked "to the end that
fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations
will not prevent substantial justice from being done." Id. at 305.
145. See supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 59 and HousE REPORT at 348-49.
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Code as well as the accompanying legislative history.146 The trus-
tee, or assignee, succeeds to the debtor's interest in the lease cum
onere, subject to all of its terms and conditions including the insol-
vency termination provision. Following the closing of the case, the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is terminated and the parties'
rights are governed by the terms of the lease under applicable non-
bankruptcy law, unless a subsequent proceeding is commenced or
the bankruptcy court has specifically retained jurisdiction. If this
approach is followed literally, the substantive force of sections
365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) could be, easily undercut by intelligent
draftsmen. Insolvency termination provisions may be extremely
detailed in scope and so narrowly tailored to the composition and
financial condition of the original debtor that a successor debtor or
assignee could not possibly comply with their terms. If such provi-
sions are given effect following the closing of the case, perceptive
draftsmen will undoubtedly attempt to circumvent the enforce-
ment of section 365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) by carefully and narrowly
drawing such provisions.
Consequently, if the Code's prohibition of enforcement of such
provisions is to be effectively employed, some additional court ac-
tion will be required-perhaps the issuance of a standing order
which either modifies the termination provision or limits the non-
debtor's ability to enforce it, except under specific circumstances.
In view of the court's broad equity power under section 105(a) of
the Code to "issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title," there is
strong statutory support for the court's issuance of such an
order. 1
47
The court should be sensitive to the possibility of unfairness
to the non-debtor. In the absence of specific statutory authority,
146. Sections 365(b)(2) and 365(e)(1) merely exempt the trustee from having to cure
insolvency-related defaults. The provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C apply only to insol-
vency defaults which occur prior to the closing of the case. The Senate Report and House
Report both stated with regard to section (e)(1):
This subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto clause to a new
insolvency or receivership after the bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the clause
is not invalidated in toto, but merely made inapplicable during the case for the
purpose of disposition of the executory contract or unexpired lease.
See supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 59 and HousE REPORT at 348.
147. In addition to section 105(a) of the Code, the bankruptcy court is empowered to
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of the respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (Supp. 1111979).
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there is no support for the position that the court can materially
suspend or alter the debtor's obligations under a lease while simul-
taneously holding the other party to performance. 48 Thus, the
court is confronted with the task of determining whether the insol-
vency termination provision is reflective of a material element of
the agreement of the parties. If it is not, then the court is justified
in ordering a modification of the provision so as to give effect to
the prohibition of insolvency termination provisions contained in
section 365. On the other hand, if the insolvency termination pro-
vision is reflective of a material aspect of the bargain struck be-
tween lessor and lessee, the court should condition the assumption
or assignment only upon sufficient assurances to the non-debtor
that the benefit of its bargain will be preserved.
D. The Problem of Terminated Leases
Suppose that XYZ Corporation is the lessee under a ground
lease having a term of ninety-nine years. Pursuant to the terms of
the lease, XYZ Corporation has constructed a substantial hotel
complex on the land at a cost of several million dollars. During the
eighth year of the term, XYZ Corporation is experiencing financial
difficulty and has defaulted in payment of both its underlying
rental and leasehold mortgage obligations. As a consequence of
these defaults, the ground lessor attempts to terminate the ground
lease under default provisions contained in the lease, thereby suc-
ceeding to the ownership of the land and improvements, subject to
existing leasehold financing. Under such facts, there is a potential
for an enormous transfer of value from XYZ Corporation to the
ground lessor. Not only does the ground lessor succeed to XYZ's
equity in the improvements, but the ground lessor also succeeds to
any increased rental value of the underlying land. 49
The purpose of section 365(b) is to allow the trustee to cure
XYZ's default and retain the value of the leasehold and improve-
ments for purposes of enhancing the possibility of a successful re-
habilitation, or for increasing distribution to general creditors. Pro-
148. See In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1972).
149. The amount of the value transfer will depend upon the rental formula stated in
the lease and existing market conditions. To the extent that any rent escalation provisions
in the lease equalize the rental payable under the lease with fair market rental value, the
transfer of value from lessee to lessor will be limited to the lessee's equity in the
improvements.
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vided that a voluntary or involuntary petition is filed prior to
effective termination of the lease, the value of these assets can be
preserved for all creditors rather than sacrificed to the lessor. On
the other hand, if the ground lessor is successful in terminating the
lease prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, there is pervasive
authority for the conclusion that the lease is not "unexpired" and
therefore is not assumable under section 365(a), nor curable under
section 365(b).15 0 This rationale has been applied even where the
basis for the pre-petition termination is an insolvency-related de-
fault. 51 So long as the termination is effective prior to filing of the
petition, it has been held that section 365(e) is inapplicable and
the insolvency termination provision is enforceable.
152
The language of section 365(e)(1) supports the position that
150. This position is undoubtedly logical. 11 U.S.C. § 365 allows the assumption of "ex-
ecutory" contracts and "unexpired" leases. Consequently, when a contract or lease has been
terminated prior to the petition, it has frequently been stated that there is no executory
contract or unexpired lease to be assumed. In re Triangle Laboratories, Inc., 663 F.2d 463
(3d Cir. 1981); In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978); In re
Commodity Merchants, Inc., 538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33
(W.D. Okla. 1976); In re Acorn Inv., 8 Bankr. 506 (S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Mimi's of Atlanta,
Inc., 5 Bankr. 623 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re GSVC Restaurant Corp., 3 Bankr. 491 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 10 Bankr. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 4 Bankr. 730
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341, 346-47 (1980) (absent fraud, a trustee cannot assume a
contract or lease validly terminated prior to bankruptcy); 2 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note
31, 1 365.04[1], at 365-29 to 365-32.
Because there were no statutory cure rights available to the trustee under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, contracts and leases could also be terminated after the filing of the petition,
unless there was an enforceable contractual provision or state law right to cure the default.
See, e.g., In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972) (trustee's decision to
adopt an executory contract does not preclude other party's contractual right to terminate
agreement). The strictness of this rule often resulted in disturbing outcomes. For example,
in Good Hope Refineries v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1979), an automatic termina-
tion was held to be sufficient to terminate an oil and gas lease when the debtor-lessee failed
to make a delayed rental payment. Despite the fact that the automatic termination occurred
after the filing of the petition, and despite the trustee's good faith attempts to tender timely
payment shortly after the termination, the court refused to allow the trustee to cure the
default. The court analogized the termination to the failure of an optionee to perform in
compliance with the terms of an option. The court stated unsympathetically: "When a
debtor or trustee fails to exercise or renew an option by paying the agreed price, there is no
contractual 'default' to be cured. The rights that the debtor purchased for the price of the
option have merely expired of their own terms." Id. at 1003.
151. In re Triangle Laboratories, Inc., 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981). See also In re Com-
modity Merchants, Inc., 538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976) (trustee could not assume commodity
futures contracts).
152. Id.
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the cure rights of section 365(b) are applicable only to leases which
are not terminated at the time of the petition. Section 365(e)(1) is
expressly limited in its application to prohibition of termination or
modification pursuant to insolvency termination provisions only if
termination or modification is attempted after commencement of
the case.
Does this mean that a lessor who fortuitously exercises his ter-
mination rights moments before the filing of the lessees' petition
can reap a potentially enormous windfall, while depriving the gen-
eral creditors of the estate of that value? Such a rule would lead to
a formal, rather than substantive, approach to the problem of "ter-
minated" leases. It is potentially abusive to condition the distribu-
tion of the leasehold's value solely upon the cunning or fortune of
the lessor in out-racing the debtor (or the debtor's creditors in the
case of an involuntary petition) and effectively terminating the
lease prior to filing of the petition. In view of the enormous impor-
tance of real property leases to reorganization efforts and the po-
tential of a large forfeiture, such a consequence hardly seems
justifiable.
Fortunately, exceptions to such a formal rule are appearing as
courts consider the problem of terminated leases. These exceptions
fall into three categories: (1) circumstances in which state law prin-
ciples can be applied to prevent pre-petition termination; 153 (2) cir-
cumstances in which the transfer of value can be avoided as a
fraudulent conveyance;154 and (3) circumstances in which the
bankruptcy courts have exercised their equitable power to prevent
forfeitures and windfalls.155 These three judicial exceptions will be
addressed separately for purposes of clarity. However, it is a pre-
mise of this Article that the equitable factors which impel the
courts to create these exceptions are so similar as to justify the
imposition of a uniform and singular test for resolving disputes
concerning the pre-petition termination of leases.
1. Terminated Leases and State Law. Whether or not a lease
has been terminated prior to the filing of the petition is a question
of non-bankruptcy law. Consequently, it has not been unusual for
bankruptcy courts to apply state law principles of waiver or estop-
153. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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pel to prevent termination when there would otherwise be a large
windfall to the non-debtor or where termination would interfere
materially with a rehabilitation effort.156 Because the trustee's
right to cure under section 365(b) is a matter of federal statutory
law, the sole concern of the bankruptcy court is not whether the
lease is terminable under state law but whether it was, in fact, ter-
minated. Thus, in addition to waiver and estoppel, the definition
of "termination" under state law becomes extremely important.
The federal courts have evidenced a willingness to "stretch"
state law concepts of termination in favor of the trustee. For in-
stance, in In re Fountainbleau Hotel Corp.,57 the debtor had sub-
stantially defaulted under its ground lease. In accordance with the
agreed-upon termination provisions in the lease, the lessor had de-
livered a notice of termination, allowed the contractual grace pe-
riod to expire, and had delivered a notice to vacate the premises. If
these actions were sufficient to "terminate" the lease under state
law, the lessor would succeed to an enormous windfall in the lease-
hold improvements constructed by the debtor. Fortunately, the
debtor was still in possession of the premises when the bankruptcy
petition was filed. The Court of Appeals held that "termination"
did not occur under Louisiana law until a judgment of possession
was rendered by the appropriate court. The court reached this de-
cision despite the fact that issuance of the judgment would have
been a pro forma matter under state law.
Similarly, in Executive Square Office Building v. O'Connor
and Associates,15 the lessor had satisfied all state law require-
ments for termination but had not yet obtained possession of the
premises. Although there was no further action required under
state law to terminate the lease, the court held that the termina-
tion might be subject to "reversal" when the lessor brought an ac-
156. In re Triangle Laboratories, Inc., 663 F.2d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Hunting-
ton, Ltd., 654 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Fountainbleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d 913 (5th
Cir. 1975); B.J.M. Realty Co. v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1964); Davidson v. Shivitz,
354 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Delta Hotel, Inc., 10 Bankr. 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Execu-
tive Square Office Bldg. v. O'Connor & Assoc., 19 Bankr. 143 (N.D. Fla. 1981). See also
Note, Bankruptcy Arrangements-Lease Forfeitures, 9 GA. L. REv. 288 (1974) (courts
should not enforce strict forfeiture clauses where the result would be a windfall to the land-
lord at the expense of public shareholder). See generally Note, The Enforceability of Lease-
Forfeiture-Upon-Bankruptcy Covenants: A Proposal for Damages as an Alternative Rem-
edy, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 354-59 (1976).
157. 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975).
158. 19 Bankr. 143 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
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tion for possession of the premises. The court stated:
As long as an asserted or alleged lease termination is still subject to an anti-
forfeiture (i.e., anti-termination) proviso of a state statute, or a right to resort
to equity for relief to prevent such forfeiture or termination, then, until such
time as such anti-forfeiture or anti-termination hurdles are cleared it may be
imprecise to say that there has been a forfeiture of termination.. :'.151
Interestingly, there was no showing in Executive Square or
Fountainbleau that the debtor could successfully assert state anti-
forfeiture laws or equitable doctrines to prevent termination. For
purposes of federal bankruptcy law, the mere possibility of raising
such a state law defense meant that the leases were not "termi-
nated" under state law.
Although the courts have often prevented windfalls or avoided
inequitable results by interpreting (or misinterpreting) state law to
find that a lease is not terminated, such an approach is haphazard,
formal, and fictional. The true concern of the courts is, obviously,
the inequity of allowing a large transfer of value from the estate to
the lessor. It would seem appropriate for the courts to apply crite-
ria which reflect this underlying concern, rather than relying upon
fictional manipulations of state law principles.
2. Terminated Leases and Fraudulent Conveyances. Section
548 of the Code grants to the trustee the power to avoid a pre-
petition transfer of property of the debtor made within one year of
the filing of the petition if such transfer was made for less than
"reasonably equivalent value." '  This section, which mirrors
closely the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act,"6 ' allows the
trustee to recapture value for the general creditors of the estate
which may have been voluntarily or involuntarily transferred to
another party without reasonably commensurate, reciprocal com-
pensation to the debtor. Accordingly, pre-petition lease termina-
tions which result in a transfer of leasehold value to the lessor
have occasionally been invalidated as fraudulent conveyances.162
159. Id. at 146. See also In re Delta Hotel, Inc., 10 Bankr. 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1979). To constitute a voidable transfer, the conveyance
must also have been made while the debtor was insolvent, undercapitalized or intending to
incur overburdensome debt.
161. 7A U.L.A. 164 (1978).
162. In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976); In re Commodity Merchants, Inc.,
538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976); and Fogel, supra note 150, at 346-47.
In an analogous situation, section 548 has been applied to rescind pre-petition mortgage
foreclosure sales when the price bid at sale was substantially less than the appraised market
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For instance, in one pre-Code liquidation case, In re Ferris,0 3 the
district court concluded that a lease termination was a fraudulent
conveyance when the termination effectively transferred to the
ground lessor both the debtor's equity in the improvements of ap-
proximately $129,000, and the increased market rental value of the
property. In return, by terminating the lease, the lessor gave only a
release from $6,000 in accrued unpaid rentals.
It is important to recognize that section 548 applies equally in
liquidation and reorganization cases. When there has been a pre-
petition transfer of value by the lessor's termination, the trustee
can intervene to preserve the lease for the benefit of the estate.
This is true even though, as in Ferris, the trustee merely intends to
assign the leasehold to a third party.
3. Terminated Leases and Equitable Powers of the Bank-
ruptcy Court-Application of Queens Boulevard to Pre-Petition
Terminations. Queens Boulevard and its progeny focused upon the
inequity in allowing a post-petition termination of leases. Are the
bankruptcy court's equity powers sufficiently broad to permit the
trustee to cure and assume a lease when, as in Queens Boulevard,
compelling equitable considerations justify continuation of the
lease? If the lessor has not relied upon the termination to his detri-
ment, then the court may be justified in conducting an analysis of
the competing equities. In compelling circumstances, it would seem
that the estate should be allowed to retain the value of the lease-
hold, rather than allowing the lessor to obtain such value by termi-
nating the lease. Otherwise, if the debtor has substantial equity in
the leasehold improvements, or if the leasehold is valuable, the
pre-petition termination will result in a windfall to the lessor.
Of course, it can be argued that by failing to act in a manner
sufficient to prevent pre-petition termination, the debtor has sacri-
value of the mortgaged property. Durret v. Washington Nat'L Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th
Cir. 1980) (non-judicial foreclosure sale was rescinded where buyer paid $115,000 for a resi-
dence valued at $200,000); In re Madrid, 10 Bankr. 795 (D. Nev. 1981) (non-judicial foreclo-
sure sale was rescinded where buyer paid approximately 64-67% of appraised value of resi-
dence). The rationale is the same for terminated leases and contracts. Since the involuntary
termination results in a significant depletion of the assets available for distribution to the
general creditors, the trustee can exercise his avoidance power under section 548 to rescind
the termination.
163. 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976). This case was decided under section 67d of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976) (repealed 1978). For purposes of this discussion,
section 67d is indistinguishable from section 548 of the Code.
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ficed any further rights under the lease. However, such logic is
completely inappropriate in a bankruptcy context. Reinstatement
of the lease is for the benefit of the creditors of the estate, not the
debtor. Unlike the debtor, the creditors are in a poor, if not impos-
sible, position to prevent a pre-petition termination. Until a peti-
tion is filed, the creditors have no practical ability to assess the
debtor's performance under the lease, and no substantive ability to
cure the debtor's defaults. Although the creditors may have an op-
portunity to prevent termination by the filing of an involuntary
petition, the time, expense, effort, and risk of filing an involuntary
petition will often preclude creditors from acting with sufficient
speed to prevent termination. In a race between a diligent lessor
seeking to terminate a lease and concerned creditors seeking to
preserve it, the lessor is highly favored to win.
There is more than meager support for applying the rationale
of Queens Boulevard to such pre-petition terminations. Over the
years, the bankruptcy court's equitable powers have been applied
in an increasingly liberal fashion.11 The Supreme Court enunci-
ated as early as 1939 that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity
and their powers are to be invoked "to the end that fraud will not
prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being
done."' 6  The Court has also noted the importance of preserving
the trustee's ability to assume the lease for the benefit of the gen-
eral creditors: "The bankruptcy court does not look with favor
upon forfeiture clauses in leases. They are liberally construed in
favor of the bankrupt lessee so as not to deprive the estate of prop-
erty which may turn out to be a valuable asset."1 6 Under the
Code, the broad equity powers of the bankruptcy court are re-
stated in section 105(a), which grants to the bankruptcy court the
power to "issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. '11 7 Also, sec-
tion 1481 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that "[a]
164. See Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles in Bank-
ruptcy, 43 REP. J. 109 (1969); see also Note, Enforceability of a Lease Termination Clause
in Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter XI, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 360, 364
(1974).
165. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
166. Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 301 (1945).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
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bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law
and admiralty . . ."168
The same types of circumstances which compelled the courts
in pre-Code cases to prohibit post-petition termination can be
found in pre-petition situations as well. If substantial improve-
ments have been constructed, if the leasehold is necessary to a via-
ble reorganization, or if a substantial forfeiture will occur, there is
little basis for distinguishing pre-petition termination from post-
petition termination. In both cases, the lessor's remedies under
state law must succumb to the overriding impetus of federal bank-
ruptcy laws.
Application of the equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts
to pre-petition termination is also justified by the unusual protec-
tion afforded to non-debtor parties under other provisions of the
Code. If the termination of a lease is prohibited, the cure provi-
sions of section 365(b) require a reinstatement of the relative posi-
tion of the lease parties to that which existed prior to the debtor's
default. As discussed earlier in the text,""9 section 365(b) permits
assumption of a defaulted lease only when any prejudice to the
lessor is reduced to a level of insignificance. Presuming that the
provisions of section 365(b) can be complied with by the trustee,
the fact that the default, and "termination," occurred prior to the
petition adds no additional burden to the lessor. Indeed, to the
extent an additional pecuniary burden exists, section 365(b)(1)(B)
compels that the lessor be compensated (or adequately assured of
prompt compensation) and to the extent that additional insecurity
or instability is created by the pre-petition nature of the "termina-
tion," section 365(b)(1)(C) requires adequate assurance of future
performance. In short, under the Code the prohibition of a pre-
petition termination does not result in any burden or prejudice dif-
ferent from that resulting from a post-petition termination.
One circuit court has considered this issue in depth. In re Tri-
angle Laboratories, Inc.17 0 involved an involuntary petition which
was filed against the debtor on August 13, 1979, prior to the effec-
tive date of the Code. The filing of the involuntary petition consti-
tuted a default under the insolvency termination provision con-
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (West Supp. 1983).
169. See supra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
170. 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981).
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tained in the lease, enforceable under the Bankruptcy Act. Prior to
dismissal of the petition, the lessor delivered the appropriate no-
tice required by the lease, specifying September 5, 1979 as the ter-
mination date. The involuntary petition was eventually dismissed
but a voluntary petition was later filed on November 11, 1979,
under Chapter 11 of the Code. The question squarely presented to
the Third Circuit was whether a lease terminated over two months
prior to the filing of the petition could be cured and assumed by
the trustee.171 In a lengthy analysis of Queens Boulevard and re-
lated cases, the court applied the equity balancing test to the lease
in Triangle Laboratories. After applying the equity balancing test,
lease termination was permitted but only because: "The considera-
tions which prompted the courts in [Queens Boulevard and related
cases] to deny enforcement of bankruptcy termination clauses on
equitable grounds are not present in this case.
172
The court emphasized that the case had been converted to a
liquidation, that there were no substantial improvements that
would constitute a windfall to the landlord and that there were no
public interest or other equitable considerations compelling contin-
uation of the lease. However, the court did not hesitate to apply
the Queens Boulevard balancing test.
1 73
It should not go unobserved that the court in Triangle Labo-
ratories could have resolved the matter of pre-petition termination
by reference to state law anti-forfeiture doctrines, or by interpret-
ing state law so as to find that the lease had not been terminated.
However, the court wisely restricted its inquiry to a more princi-
pled resolution of the conflict between the lessor and the general
creditors of the estate. The court apparently recognized that the
purpose behind application of state law doctrines is often, if not
171. The Court did not find that the lease had actually been terminated on September
5. The case was remanded to determine under state law whether the lessor had effectively
terminated the lease.
172. 663 F.2d at 470.
173. Several other courts have applied the equity balancing test to evaluate the propri-
ety of permitting pre-petition termination. Balancing the value to the estate against the
prejudice to the lessor has usually resulted in allowance of termination. In re Jolly, 574 F.2d
349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978); In re Commodity Merchants, Inc., 538 F.2d
1260 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976); In re Mimi's of At-
lanta, Inc., 5 Bankr. 623 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 10 Bankr. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Bronx-
Westchester Mack Corp., 4 Bankr. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In at least one case, the balance has
been resolved in favor of prohibiting pre-petition lease termination. In re Furniture Ware-
house Sales, Inc., 2 Bankr. 293 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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always, to prevent an inequitable result. It seems far more appro-
priate to apply equitable criteria directly, rather than resorting to
indirect, non-uniform and haphazard application of state law prin-
ciples. It makes far more sense to condition the trustee's ability to
cure and assume the lease upon the relative prejudice to the par-
ties. So long as the burden is placed upon the trustee to show that
circumstances warrant continuation of the lease and that the lessor
can be protected from harm, the rights of the lessor can be fully
preserved and the rights of general creditors uniformly vindicated
in all state jurisdictions.
III. THE EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION OR REJECTION
A. Consequences of Assumption
It was well settled under the Bankruptcy Act that once the
trustee had, with court approval, assumed a lease, the estate was
thereafter liable for performance of all of the terms and conditions
of the lease. 17 Similar to other post-petition obligations incurred
by the estate, rather than the debtor, the estate became fully liable
for performance of the lease as a first priority administrative ex-
pense. To do otherwise would entitle the estate to full performance
of the benefits of the lease while limiting the non-debtor to only
partial performance in return, a practice clearly rejected by Con-
gress in other contexts.17 5 Consequently, under the old Act, the es-
tate became fully liable for performance of an assumed lease, even
if the lease was later rejected. In the absence of an agreement be-
tween the parties, the only manner in which the estate could avoid
liability under an assumed lease would be to assign the lease to
another party.
176
174. See In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940) (adoption of lease by
an equity receiver creates privity of estate); Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Pop. de P. R., 360
F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Assoc. v. Smith, 336 F.2d 528 (9th
Cir. 1964); Countryman II, supra note 86, at 532; 6 COLLmR (14th ed.), supra note 68, 1
3.24[2].
175. The requirement of mutuality of performance is discussed in detail in connection
with the analysis of insolvency termination provisions earlier in the text. See supra text
accompanying notes 90-109. Generally, the Senate and House Reports indicated that "the
courts will have to insure that the trustee's performance under the contract or lease gives
the other party the full benefit of his bargain." See supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 59 and
HoUSE REPORT at 348.
176. Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act specifically provided that the estate would be
relieved from liability for future benefits if, after notice and hearing, and subject to such
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Although there are no Code provisions expressly addressing
the effect of lease assumption, there is little doubt that Congress
intended to confirm the pre-Code doctrine that assumption binds
the estate, even if the lease is later rejected. Support for this posi-
tion can be found in several Code sections which presuppose estate
liability. For example, section 365(k) relieves the trustee from lia-
bility upon assignment of an assumed lease to a third party; sec-
tion 365(g) provides that rejection of a lease following an earlier
assumption is to be treated as a post-petition breach; 17 and sec-
tion 502(g)1 7 1 limits allowable unsecured claims to those claims
arising from leases which have not been previously assumed. Thus,
it is apparent that claims arising from rejection of assumed leases
are to be treated as administration expense claims under section
503.179 This means, of course, that the decision to assume the lease
becomes one of major importance to the estate, since assumption
effectively obligates assets which would otherwise be available for
distribution to unsecured creditors for payment of additional first
priority administrative expenses.
B. Rejection of Leases of Debtor-Lessors
There are some unique considerations which arise when the
lease of a debtor-lessor is rejected. To understand these considera-
tions fully, and the unusual provisions of the Code which address
them, it is helpful to review the state of affairs under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
There is general agreement among legal scholars that a com-
mercial lease transaction is a bifurcated transaction. The lease con-
sists of both the conveyance of a leasehold estate, and an executory
contract between the parties governing their future performance
with regard to such matters as rent, use, utilities, repairs, and con-
conditions as the court might fix, the lease was assigned to a third party. 11 U.S.C. § 70b
(1976) (repealed 1978).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2) (1978) sets up a procedure for determining whether the claim
arising from a rejected contract or lease will be treated as an administrative expense claim
entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) in the event a rehabilitation case is converted
to a liquidation case. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2) is based upon the presupposition that liability for
the breach of assumed contracts and leases is an administrative expense liability of the
estate.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1982).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1982).
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struction of improvements.180 Accordingly, in the context of bank-
ruptcy law, there was abundant authority181 and commentary
82
treating real property leases as divisible under the Bankruptcy Act,
for purposes of determining the effect of the trustee's rejection
upon the status of (i) the leasehold estate, and (ii) the contractual
covenants contained in the lease. It had been widely and wisely
confirmed that rejection could serve to terminate only that portion
of the lease transaction which was contractual and executory. Re-
jection could not terminate the leasehold estate. After all, it was
commonly pointed out, the conveyance of the leasehold is an exe-
cuted conveyance which, similar to any other pre-petition transfer,
is not subject to unilateral divestment by the trustee, unless the
transfer can be avoided as a preferential, unperfected or fraudulent
transfer.
This bifurcated conception of the effect of rejection was sup-
ported by the inclusion of the "savings clause" of section 70b in
the Chandler Act of 1938.183 The "savings clause" provided in per-
180. An oft-quoted statement which expresses well this division of lease transactions
into contract and conveyance can be found in 2 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1
221[1], at 180-81 (1982):
The "business lease" has become both more common and of more social impor-
tance than the agrarian lease. This has, as a corollary, increased the importance,
as between lessors and lessees, of the structures on the leased land. The com-
plexities of city life, and the proliferated problems of modern society in general,
have created new problems for lessors and lessees and these have been com-
monly handled by specific clauses inserted in leases. This growth in the number
and detail of specific lease covenants has reintroduced into the law of estates for
years a predominantly contractual ingredient. In practice, the law today con-
cerning estates for years consists chiefly of rules determining the construction
and effect of lease covenants. Thus the background of the lease as a conveyance,
built solidly by 1500, has a tremendous foreground, evolved largely since 1800,
which is purely contractual in character. The modem law is the synthesis of
these two historical factors. (footnotes omitted).
For extensive discussions of the status of real property leases as both contract and convey-
ance, see Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 443
(1972); Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and
Back in 900 Years? 9 KAN. L. REv. 367 (1961); Siegel, Landlord's Bankruptcy: A Proposal
for Treatment of the Lease by Reference to Its Component Elements, 54 B.Y.U.L. REV. 905
(1974) [hereinafter referred to as Siegel].
181. See In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904
(5th Cir. 1978).
182. See Siegel, supra note 179, at 907-09; Creedon and Zinman, Landlord's Bank-
ruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAW 1391 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Creedon
and Zinman]; 2 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 31, 365.09, at 365-42.
183. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
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tinent part: "Unless a lease of real property expressly otherwise
provides, a rejection of the lease or any covenant therein by the
trustee of the lessor does not deprive the lessee of his estate."1
There was general agreement among commentators that the func-
tion of the savings clause was to segregate the contractual and con-
veyancing portions of the lease so as to permit the trustee to re-
lieve the estate from the necessity of completing performance of
burdensome executory covenants while preserving the lessee's "es-
tate" from divestment.185
The savings clause was obviously an attempt to preserve sta-
bility in lease relations by assuring the commercial lessee that his
long range plans would not be substantially upset by the interven-
ing bankruptcy of the lessor. But the degree of protection was
never identified under the Bankruptcy Act. What aspects of the
lessee's "estate" did the savings clause seek to protect? Did it in-
clude only the right to remain in possession for the original term
fixed in the lease? Did it also include the right to retain such pos-
session at the rent reserved in the lease; to remain in possession
during renewal terms not yet exercised at the time of the filing of
184. Id.
185. There was virtually universal agreement that the savings clause of section 70b
served a segregating function, permitting the trustee to reject only those portions of the
lease which were contractual and "executory," but not the lessee's "estate." Although there
were few cases which arose under the Bankruptcy Act concerning rejection by debtor-les-
sors, there was extensive commentary upon the question of what constituted the lessee's
"estate." See Siegel, supra note 179; Silverstein, supra note 55, at 484; Creedon and
Zinman, supra note 181; Gottesman, The Onus of Executory Contracts: Focus on Vendors
and Lessors, 4 PRAc. LAW. 65 (1978); Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and
Leases in Bankruptcy Chapter X and XI Proceedings, 18 PRAc. LAW. 15 (1972); Jacobson,
Lessor's Bankruptcy: The Draftsman's Response to the Tenant's Plight, 1 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 152 (1972).
The magnitude of the consequences resulting from a resolution of this issue was brought
to the fore during the Penn Central Railroad reorganization. The trustees of the railroad
sought to reject 21 ground leases of land in New York City, upon which the lessees had
constructed and subleased several large office buildings. Unfortunately for the debtor and
the debtor's creditors, the rent reserved in the leases was far below market value of the
leaseholds. Although the debtor had undertaken virtually no affirmative obligations under
the ground leases, the trustees rejected the leases, intending that rejection would terminate
the rental convenants which, they asserted, were not part of the lessees' "estates." If, as the
trustees asserted, the "estates" of the lessees included only the right to possession and not
the right to possession at the rental stated in the lease, a vast transfer of value would take
place. In response to the argument of the trustees, the district court noted that it was "un-
resolved" whether the rental covenants could be disaffirmed, but refused to permit the re-
jection on other grounds, leaving the issue as it found it--"unresolved." In re Penn Central
Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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the bankruptcy petition; to compel the lessor to provide utility and
elevator service in multi-tenant structures when a failure to do so
might effectively deprive the lessee of its use and enjoyment of the
premises?
Abundant literature emerged in which a great hoopla was
raised in the quest to determine the line between those parts of a
lease which were contractual, and therefore subject to rejection,
and those parts of a lease which were part of the leasehold "estate"
described in section 70b, and therefore inviolate."' 6 In the absence
of a strong judicial stance or additional legislation, neither of
which occurred under the Bankruptcy Act, such line drawing was a
hopeless task. There existed no uniform federal policy which could
be relied upon to give consistent answers to these questions. The
drafters of section 70b had been sufficiently vague so as to leave
the commentators, and the few courts which considered the issue,
to rely upon application of state law principles in determining the
meaning of the lessee's "estate." Unfortunately, state law was by
no means uniform in this area and, in most instances, state law
principles were irrelevant, if not inappropriate, to a sensible reso-
lution of the issue.
The doctrine most consistently applied by the bankruptcy
courts was that covenants which "run with the land" under state
law should be included in the lessee's "estate," while those that do
not run with the land-the "personal covenants"-should be
treated as terminated by rejection.1 87 Such an approach was prob-
lematical. The state law doctrine of covenants "running with the
land" was established in most jurisdictions primarily to limit un-
due restraints upon alienation and to define the duties of successor
landowners with respect to appurtenant easements and equitable
servitudes. The relationship of such state law categorizations to a
legitimate basis for permitting the trustee to disaffirm rental or re-
186. See supra authorities listed in note 184. The legislative history which preceded the
enactment of section 70b and an extensive analysis of the viewpoints of Professor Mac-
Laughlin, the principal drafter of the provision, can be found in Creedon and Zinman, supra
note 181, and Silverstein, supra note 55, at 487-88. None of the authors are able to reach a
definitive conclusion regarding the drafters' conception of the lessee's "estate."
187. The theory is explained in Creedon and Zinman, supra note 181, at 1413, and
Silverstein, supra note 55, at 490. These authors do not necessarily adopt the "covenants
running with the land" theory as the preferred thesis for determining the contents of the
lessee's estate under section 70b. However, in the absence of a federal policy, they turn to
the theory with something akin to frustration.
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newal covenants in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding is, to
say the least, elusive.
The confusion which followed the application of state law
principles can be seen in the few but erratic court decisions which
sought to interpret the savings clause of section 70b. In In re New
York Investors Mutual Group, Inc.,"8 one district court applied
New York law and found a covenant by the lessor to either renew
the lease, or purchase the leasehold improvements upon expiration
of the original term, was a covenant "running with the land" which
was part of the lessee's estate under state law. Consequently, the
trustee was estopped from forcing the lessee to vacate the premises
at the end of the original term of the lease unless the trustee paid
the lessee the value of the improvements. On the other hand, in
Coy v. Title Guaranty & Trust Company,89 another district court
permitted an equity receiver to reject a five-year renewal option
upon finding that it did not constitute part of the leasehold estate
under Oregon law.190 In yet another attempt to define the lessee's
estate, it was held in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New
York Rys.,"1 1 that whether a renewal term was part of the lease-
hold estate would depend upon whether it was a "present demise"
under state law.
In one apparently aberrant decision, a bankruptcy court had
gone so far as to state that even the right to possession may not be
part of the lessee's estate but that under state law the tenant's
estate consists solely of the right to remain a tenant at sufferance.
The case, In re Freeman,92 has been universally criticized and it
can be stated with some certainty that the intent of Congress in
including the savings provision of section 70b was to preserve for
188. 153 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom., Cohen v. East Netherland Hold-
ing Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1958).
189. 198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912).
190. A similar result would occur in California and the District of Columbia. A renewal
option may sometimes be treated as a "mere" contractual right rather than a present demise
of an interest in land. Klepper v. Hoover, 21 Cal. App. 3d 460, 98 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1971); In
re "K" St. Ltd. Partnership, 16 CoLLmR B~wc CAS. 8, 24 (Bankr. D.C. 1978).
191. 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
192. 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943). This case has been criticized by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978), and received
dishonorable mention in In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979). See also 2 COLLER (15th
ed.), supra note 31, 1 365.09, at 365-45. It seems obvious that if the use in section 70b of the




the lessee at least the right to continued possession for the original
term of the lease.
The unsatisfactory consequences of using state law principles
to describe the bankruptcy estate were articulated well by the
bankruptcy court in In re "K" Street Limited Partnership.19 3 In
that case, the trustee had rejected a commercial space lease, assert-
ing that the rejection resulted in a termination of the rental cove-
nant and the options to renew contained in the lease. The rental
covenant was held to be part of the leasehold "estate" on two
grounds. First, the court held that the obligation of the lessee to
pay rent required future performance only on the part of the lessee
and, therefore, could not be an executory covenant subject to rejec-
tion.19 4 Second, the court found that under state law "this cove-
nant is an integral and related part of the lessee's estate and under
traditional concepts is deemed to be a covenant which runs with
the land.1 1 5 However, the court refused to find that the options to
renew were part of the lessee's estate. The court based its decision
upon the law of the District of Columbia, which distinguishes be-
tween rights to renew the term of the lease, which are not part of
the original demise, and rights to extend the lease term, which are
part of the original demise. The court expressed its dissatisfaction
with its own holding:
As with the covenant dealing with accrued rent, there are few and only preca-
rious guidelines to illuminate that path, and the court feels that the only
satisfactory approach is to determine the effect of the covenant vis-a-vis the
rights of the trustee and the tenant by reference to existing state law. Recog-
nizing that this approach is not conducive to promoting a uniform interpreta-
tion in all jurisdictions, it seems mandated by the fact that there is no federal
common law of property.'"
In summary, the status of rejected leases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act was neither uniform nor clear. The cases and commen-
tary turned to rigid but unrelated state law concepts to resolve a
question which was, and is, a question requiring resolution based
upon underlying purposes of the bankruptcy laws. To what extent
should the intervention of a lessor's bankruptcy upset the stability
of lease arrangements? The "estate" preservation language of sec-
193. 16 CoumR BANKR. CAs. 8 (Bankr. D.C. 1978).
194. Id. at 22.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 23.
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tion 70b clearly set forth a legislative determination that posses-
sion not be disturbed. However, it left in doubt the other multifari-
ous derivatives of this problem.
The problem is not easily resolved. There are compelling argu-
ments supporting the viewpoints of both the general creditors and
real property lessees. The general creditors seek the realization of
any additional rental value in the leased premises. From the gen-
eral creditors' viewpoint, an increase in the rent reserved to market
value merely forces the lessee to sacrifice its economic advantage
over the debtor and pay market value for the premises. Such a re-
arrangement of the lessee's rights may seem minor when compared
to the severe scaling down of unsecured creditors' claims. Why, it
may be argued, should all other unsecured creditors be entitled to
receive only a pro-rata distribution on their claims, while the lessee
is unaffected by the debtor's bankruptcy? Furthermore, the gen-
eral creditors in a Chapter 11 case can rightly argue that the in-
creased rental flow may contribute significantly to a viable rehabil-
itation. Indeed, in some instances, the filing of the debtor's
petition may have been generated by the inadequate income flow
from the lease.
On the other hand, stability in lease relations requires that
real property lessees be assured of uninterrupted possession and
unchanging rental terms if they are to be able to act with certainty
regarding their future business operation. Particularly in net and
ground lease situations, it is primarily upon the basis of the lease
terms that the value of the leasehold estate is determined,
leasehold financing is obtained, sublease rentals are established,
and buildings, improvements and tenant fixtures are constructed.
The viability of ground and net leases as useful economic arrange-
ments would be drastically undermined by allowing alteration of
rental provisions whenever the lessor was the subject of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
That this conflict between the competing interests of real
property lessees and the general creditors of the estate could not
be rationally resolved by reference to non-uniform state law was
recognized in the initial Commission Bill. 197 The Commission Bill
took a strong stand in favor of the real property lessee. Section 4-
602(c) of the Commission Bill provided that "the rejection of a
197. See supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 236 and HoUSE REPORT at 31.
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lease under which the debtor is lessor constitutes the abandonment
of the leased property to the lessee and not a breach of the lease."
Recognizing the difficulty of dividing a lease into its "contractual"
and "estate" components, the commentary accompanying the
Commission Bill elaborated that the purpose of this provision was
to eliminate the need for courts to make the distinction. Instead,
as the Commission pointed out: "[T]he lessor's trustee, or the
debtor in possession, is called upon to compare the negative value
of an unprofitable lease with the remaining value of the lease prop-
erty. If the outcome shows a negative net value, he should abandon
the leased property to the lessee." 198 The all or nothing approach
of the Commission Bill prohibited the estate from realizing the en-
hanced value of the leasehold. Moreover, the non-segregating fea-
ture of the Commission Bill denied the trustee the ability to termi-
nate any of the contractual aspects of the lease, unless he was
prepared to sacrifice any assignable reversionary interest which the
estate might have. The trustee would be forced in all instances to
either assume the lease, and thereby bind the estate to perform it,
or abandon the lease without receiving any compensation for the
transfer of the reversionary interest. Obviously, the only circum-
stances under which the trustee would be justified in rejecting the
lease would be where the estate was suffering a positive drain as a
result of performance of the lease-that is, if the leasehold prop-
erty were truly burdensome in the "net loss" sense of American
Brake Shoe.
Section 365(h)199 takes an entirely different conceptual ap-
proach than that recommended by the Commission. 200 However,
198. COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 1, at 157.
199. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor
under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the
lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in pos-
session for the balance of the term that is enforceable by such lessee under ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If such lessee remains in possession, such lessee may offset against the
rent reserved under such lease for the balance of the term after the date of the
rejection of such lease, and any such renewal or extension, any damages occur-
ring after such date caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the
debtor after such date, but such lessee does not have any rights against the es-
tate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other
than such offset.
200. Section 365(h) is based upon a provision first appearing in the Judges' Bill, supra
[Vol. 32
LEASE DISPOSITION IN BANKRUPTCY
the practical result of the trustee's exercise of his rejection powers
under the Code may be identical to that of the Commission
Bill-the trustee will not be in a position to reject the lease unless
it constitutes a net loss to the estate. The cause of this phenome-
non is the right of offset granted to the lessee in section 365(b)(1).
The rejection will be effective to relieve the estate from the
debtor's contractual obligations under the lease while permitting
the estate to continue collecting rent under the lease. However, the
lessee will be able to offset "any damages occurring after such date
caused by the non-performance of any obligation of the debtor af-
ter such date." Accordingly, the estate will receive no benefit from
rejection unless the total cost of performance of the lessor's obliga-
tion exceeds the rent reserved in the lease. In those cases where
the cost of lessor's performance is less than the rent reserved, any
benefit to the estate resulting from non-performance will be offset
by an equal, and perhaps greater, decrease in the rent received. 201
It is only where the cost of operation exceeds the rent re-
served, and such cost can effectively be transferred to the lessee by
termination, that the rejection will succeed in benefiting the estate
by eliminating the net loss. The rental due under the lease may be
note 1. Section 4-602(c) of the Judges' Bill applied to both personal and real property leases
and provided that:
[T]he rejection of a lease under which the debtor is the lessor shall give the
lessee the option of continuing the occupancy of the leased premises or posses-
sion of the leased property, as the case may be, upon lessee's payment of the
rentals stipulated by the lease agreement to the successor to debtor's interest as
lessor; lessee shall have the further option of performing lessor's defaulted obli-
gations at lessee's costs and to receive offset credit for those costs against lessee's
stipulated rental payments.
201. The economic implications of rejection are set out in full later in the text. To the
extent that the benefit to the estate in reducing the lessor's obligations is neutralized by a
decrease in rental income, the estate gains nothing by rejection. Because the cost of per-
forming the lessor's obligations may be greater for the lessee (causing a larger offset against
rental), rejection will succeed only in reducing the net profit to the estate.
There are, however, circunistances in which rejection may be justified notwithstanding
the absence of a current net loss under the lease. Where the lessor has only minimal service
obligations under the lease but the lease contains extensive provisions for the lessor's recon-
struction and repair in the event of damage to the improvements, the trustee may be able to
avoid this future liability by rejecting the lease. The rejection would succeed in terminating
the repair provision but would not otherwise upset present rental flow under the lease, since
it would be extremely difficult for the lessee to show damages arising from the rejection. If
at some future date the premises are substantially damaged, and the cost of repair exceeds
the remaining rental reserved in the lease, the trustee will have succeeded in avoiding a
future net loss by rejecting the lease at the time of the bankruptcy case even though no
current net loss then existed.
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entirely offset by the lessee but at least the positive drain on the
estate will be reduced.202
A closer look at section 365 brings to light some other interest-
ing, and sometimes bothersome, points. It should be carefully ob-
served that section 365(h) does not segregate the lease into compo-
nent elements. Instead, the lease is treated as completely rejected,
but the effects of rejection are carefully specified, thereby creating
a uniform federal policy regarding the aspects of the lease transac-
tion which survive rejection.
1. Option to Terminate. Section 365(h)(1) permits the lessee,
at its option, to treat the lease as terminated by the rejection. This
is a substantial departure from section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act,
which forced the lessee to rely on state law doctrine in attempting
to suspend its own rental obligations under the lease. The common
law rule is that rental and other lease covenants are independent.
The lessee is not relieved of its rental obligations as a result of the
lessor's non-performance of other lease covenants, unless there is a
specific lease provision allowing termination.20 3 Thus, in pre-Code
cases, the lessee was often bound to continue paying rent under
the lease despite the trustee's rejection unless the lessee could,
under state law, vacate the premises and successfully argue that
the lessor's non-performance constituted a constructive eviction.2 4
202. The fact that the trustee terminates the lease does not mean that all costs will be
transferred to the lessee. The lessee will obviously have no interest in paying taxes or under-
taking structural improvements unless necessary for its continued use of the premises. The
lessor will be forced to continue to undertake some costly obligations with respect to the
premises so as to preserve the reversionary interest in the property. Thus the drain on the
estate may not be entirely reduced. That this may impel the trustee to abandon the prem-
ises is clearly a possibility.
203. In most jurisdictions, it is still settled law that the lessee's obligation to pay rent is
independent of the lessor's affirmative obligations. See Jacobson, supra note 184, at 159;
Siegel, supra note 179, at 911; and Suher, Protecting the Equipment Lessee From the Po-
tential Consequences of the Lessor's Bankruptcy, 4 U. DAroN L. REV. 361, 373 n.46 (1979).
Some jurisdictions have altered this rule by statute. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 1700
(Supp. 1974); CAL. CiV. CODE ANN. 1942(a) (West Supp. 1982). A few jurisdictions have
altered the rule by court decision. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). Other jurisdictions have
refused to allow the lessee to terminate, but have allowed a right of offset as a defense to the
lessor's action to collect rent. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 1 3.11 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, 10.101 (1974).
204. See In re "K" St. Ltd. Partnership, 16 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 8, 17 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1978). Constructive eviction was often an unacceptable remedy for the lessee. As
the court in In re "K" Street noted, constructive eviction requires as a precondition to its
assertion that the tenant vacate the premises within a reasonable time following the "evic-
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The elective nature of the lessee's termination right under section
365(h)(1) serves to supersede state law and thereby prevent the
possibility of coercing the lessee into continued occupancy of the
premises when, notwithstanding the right of offset, the lessee con-
siders the lessor's non-performance and inconvenience sufficient to
justify termination and relocation. 05
The Code does not specify a time period within which the
lessee must make its election. However, it is clear that if the lessee
desires to file a claim for damages as a result of rejection, as per-
mitted by section 365(g), 0s the lessee will have to comply with any
filing requirements and time restrictions which are set pursuant to
section 502(d)207 for the filing of claims arising from rejection of
contracts and leases. Unless the lessee has no substantial claim
which it would like to assert as a result of the termination, the
lessee will be forced by practical considerations to make its elec-
tion within the time period to be fixed pursuant to section 502(d).
2. Possession of the Leasehold Estate and Length of Term.
The second option under section 365(h)(1) is to remain in posses-
sion for the balance of the original term and any "renewal or ex-
tension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee under appli-
cable non-bankruptcy law."2 This provision resolves several
serious questions which had arisen under section 70b.
Initially, section 365(h)(1) represents a final discreditation of
In re Freeman, making it clear that the lessee has a right to re-
main in possession notwithstanding rejection by the trustee. The
provision also eliminates the confusion and conffict which had
arisen among the cases concerning whether or not the lessee's op-
tion to renew or extend was part of the lessee's "estate." Lessees
tion." In addition, constructive eviction is an affirmative defense to an action for rent, and
can only be asserted if the lessor's non-performance was so substantial as to constructively
deprive the lessee of his use and enjoyment of the leased premises. Consequently, a lessee
seeking to take advantage of the constructive eviction doctrine would be forced to vacate the
premises even though it was unclear whether the defense could be successfully raised in a
later action for rent brought by the lessor. See also 33 A.L.R.3d, 1356 (1970).
205. The language of section 365(h)(2) is unequivocal and sets no limiting standards for
termination by the lessee. It states simply that the lessee "may treat the lease as terminated
by such rejection."
206. Section 365(g) is discussed earlier in the text. See supra text accompanying note
176. Depending upon whether the lease has been assumed prior to rejection, the lessee will
have either an unsecured or administrative expense claim.
207. See supra note 19, Proposed Rule 3002.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1) (1978) (emphasis added).
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are unequivocally entitled under the Code to exercise renewal or
extension options, notwithstanding the trustee's rejection, to the
extent that the options can be unilaterally enforced under state
law. This is quite different from the result under section 70b of the
Bankruptcy Act. The effect of rejection upon renewal options is
now a matter of federal policy. They simply are not affected by
rejection. However, their enforcement by the lessee is a matter of
state law, as it would be in the absence of bankruptcy. The lessee
is entitled to occupancy for as long a period of time as he would
have been able to continue occupancy under the terms of his lease,
had the bankruptcy of the lessor not intervened.
It should be noted that application of section 365(h)(1) to re-
newal option will not always be easy. Renewal and extension
clauses often contain detailed language which may provide, in the
event of the lessee's exercise of the option, for the renegotiation or
adjustment of rent and other conditions of occupancy during the
renewal period. Such renegotiation or adjustment of conditions
may be based upon reference to objective criteria which are indica-
tive of changes in market rental value, such as relative changes in
the consumer price index. Alternatively, the parties may agree to
an adjustment in rental based upon their own future agreement as
to the then fair market value of the leased premises; or they may
elaborate a procedure for the determination of rental based upon
the findings of disinterested third parties selected by them. The
procedure for adjustment in rental during the renewal period, and
perhaps changes in other conditions of occupancy as well, will vary
depending upon the agreement of the parties and may range from
their agreement to simply negotiate in good faith, to complex arbi-
tration procedures.
What is the status of such procedural provisions under the
Code? There is some disturbing language in the legislative his-
tory,20" but the effect of rejection upon such provisions should be
209. Prior to final amendment and enactment, both S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, supra note
1, contained provisions which differed from current section 365(h). S. 2266 provided that the
lessee could remain in possession for "the balance of the term including any term or terms
which may be provided by otherwise enforceable options of renewal or extension." H.R.
8200 provided only that the lessee "may remain in possession for the balance of the term of
such lease." The Senate and House Reports indicated:
The balance of the term of the lease referred to in paragraph [365(h)(1)] will
include any renewal terms that are enforceable by the tenant, but not renewal
terms if the landlord had an option to terminate. Thus, the tenant will not be
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the same as simple, self-executing renewal provisions: they should
be unaffected by rejection and be enforced against the lessor to the
extent they could have been under state law. So long as the lessee
has the unequivocal right to compel continued occupancy under
state law, it should make no difference that the terms of occupancy
require the involvement of the lessor, unless the lessor has com-
plete discretion to bar the renewal or extension. Particularly in
times of inflation, prediction of future market values is a difficult,
if not impossible, task. Elaborate renewal and extension provisions
benefit both parties by allowing the lessee to assure that he can
retain a specific business location for an extended period of time,
while the lessor can assure that he will be able to adjust rental
terms upward to market value. Such an arrangement is commonly
used in lease transactions and is an undeniably reasonable com-
mercial relationship which should not, in the absence of clear stat-
utory language, be eliminated by the application of section 365(h).
3. Right of Offset. The right of offset in subsection 365(h)(2)
drastically reduces the adverse effect of rejection upon real prop-
erty lessees who desire to remain in possession of their leasehold
premises. By offsetting against the rental the full cost of perform-
ing the lessor's rejected obligations, the lessee is entitled to con-
tinue in occupancy under conditions very similar to those which
existed prior to rejection. To the extent that the cost of performing
the lessor's obligations or obtaining substitute performance does
not exceed the rent reserved in the lease, the lessee is unaffected
deprived of his estate for the term for which he bargained.
See supra note 1, SENATE REPORT at 60 and HouSE REPORT at 349. However, the debates in
both the Senate and House included the following statement, which was read into the
record:
The ... amendment makes clear that in the case of a bankrupt lessor, a lessee
may remain in possession for the balance of the term of a lease and any renewal
or extension may be obtained by the lessee without the permission of the land-
lord or some third party under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
124 CONG. REc. H11,093 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17,410 (1978). Perhaps the best interpreta-
tion of the latter statement is that the lessee be prohibited from continuing to occupy the
premises under a renewal provision which gives the lessor sufficient discretion to terminate
unilaterally the lease rather than permit the lessee to exercise the renewal option. As dis-
cussed in the text, renewal options often contain provisions requiring the assistance or coop-
eration of the lessor, and/or third parties, in defining the conditions which are to govern
during the renewal period. However, the lessee may nevertheless have an absolute right to
extend or renew the term. Such cases should be distinguished from those where the lessor
can, by the terms of the lease, unilaterally preclude exercise of the renewal provision.
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by the lessor's repudiation. This right of offset is the highest prior-
ity afforded any claim under the Code. "Payment" of the lessee's
damage claim is unaffected by insufficient assets or costs of
administration.
There is one minor limitation upon the right to offset. If the
lessee elects to remain in possession, the right of offset is the sole
remedy against the estate for damages arising after the rejection.
However, the lessee is usually far better off offsetting its damage
claims against the rent than if an unsecured claim is filed against
the estate.
Unfortunately, the effect of subsection 365(h)(2) may be more
detrimental to the estate than Congress anticipated. As a result of
the right of offset, the estate will rarely be able to benefit from
rejection, and in some instances the inability of the trustee to re-
lieve the estate from leases which are unfavorable may result in
abandonment of the leased property. This point is illustrated by
considering the economic calculation which the trustee must make
with regard to the question of rejecting a particular lease. The
trustee's decision will be governed by the degree to which the basic
obligations of real property ownership-taxes, maintenance, insur-
ance, repair and similar matters-have been allocated between the
lessor and lessee. If the trustee wishes to preserve the reversionary
value of the leased property against waste or tax foreclosure, he
will have to assure that these basic obligations of ownership are
fulfilled notwithstanding the rejection of the lease. In the net lease
or ground lease situation, the lessee often has assumed substantial
obligations with regard to payment of such items, and the lessor's
obligations will be so minimal that it is doubtful that rejection can
benefit the estate. Unless there is a net loss to the estate, which is
highly unlikely, the rejection has no functional importance. The
lessee will remain in possession at the rental provided in the
lease.210 Even if there were some small benefit accruing to the es-
tate from the termination of a net or ground lease, such benefit
would certainly be counterbalanced by the significant problem of
compelling the lessee to continue paying taxes, or undertaking
maintenance and other affirmative obligations which the lessee had
210. In a net lease or ground lease situation, the lessor is far more likely to have a
positive income flow from the property. Where there is no net loss to the estate, rejection
clearly serves no function except, perhaps, to terminate a future obligation of the lessor to
rebuild the improvements in the event of destruction.
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agreed to perform under the lease. In net lease and ground lease
situations, it is beneficial to the lessor to retain the ability to en-
force those provisions of the lease requiring the lessee to pay for
basic obligations of land ownership. Otherwise the lessor will have
to undertake such obligations in order to preserve the reversionary
interest in the property.
In a space lease situation, where the lessor has retained the
primary obligations of maintenance, taxes and similar items, the
trustee will be faced with a different and perhaps more perplexing
problem. Certainly, there is no benefit in rejecting such leases
when there is a positive rent flow from the property. But is it pos-
sible that rejection does not benefit the estate even when there is a
net loss? Rejection may prove to be of little utility in these circum-
stances as well. Consider an example where the rent reserved is
$2,000 per year, the lessor's cost of operation is $2,200 (composed
of $1,800 in taxes, debt service and insurance; and $400 in mainte-
nance, utility and janitorial services). If the trustee rejects the
lease, the lessee will be able to offset up to $2,000 of the costs of
supplying utility and janitorial service which, when supplied by the
lessor, were only $400. The benefit to the estate in rejecting the
lease in such circumstances is highly doubtful. The lessor under
the lease will have to continue paying taxes, debt service and in-
surance in the amount of $1,800 in order to preserve its reversion-
ary interest. The rental the lessor is entitled to receive will be re-
duced by the offset of the lessee's damages by an amount of at
least $400. Thus, the estate will continue to suffer a net loss, not-
withstanding the rejection, and that loss may actually be increased
as a result of the lessee's right to offset the cost of substitute per-
formance.211 In such circumstances, the trustee will have to deter-
mine whether it is in the best interests of the estate to abandon
the leased property. The decision will depend upon whether or not
the capitalized value of the reversionary interest exceeds the yearly
net loss to the lessor. Even if retention of the property is justified
211. Using the example in the text, the lessor's pre-rejection loss was $200 per year
($2,200 in expenses less $2,000 in income). Following rejection, the lessor will remain obli-
gated for $1,800 in taxes, debt service and maintenance, while the rental is reduced from
$2,000 to $1,400 or less as a result to the lessee's cost of providing janitorial and utility
services at a cost to the lessee of $600. The net loss to the estate will have been increased to
$400 as a result of the greater cost to the lessee in providing the services that had been
provided by the lessor.
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on the basis of such a calculation, rejection will not be. If the lessee
can offset more than the cost to the lessor of performing those ob-
ligations which are effectively transferred to the lessee by the re-
jection, then rejection will serve only to increase the loss to the
estate. Thus, except in those rare situations where rejection results
in the lessor's obligations being performed at less cost by the
lessee, the trustee will be better off assuming the lease and keeping
the net loss to the estate as small as possible. The only other alter-
native is to reject the lease and abandon the reversionary interest.
Section 365(h)(2) undoubtedly gives the lessee a broad base
upon which he can assert his offset claims. The pertinent part of
the provision provides that the lessee may offset "any damages oc-
curring after [rejection] caused by the non-performance of any ob-
ligation of the debtor after [the rejection]." In the predecessor pro-
vision of the Judges Bill, 212 which served as the model for section
365(h), it was provided that the "lessee shall have the further op-
tion of performing lessor's defaulted obligations at lessee's costs
and to receive offset.... The Judges Bill was obviously intended
to limit the right of offset to the cost of obtaining substitute per-
formance of the lessor's lease obligations. The more expansive lan-
guage of section 365(h)(2) covers the cost of such substitute per-
formance as well as other damages arising therefrom. It is unclear
whether Congress intended to allow lessees to offset general or spe-
cial damages available under state law, but the broad language of
section 365(h)(2) would seem to allow the lessee to recover dam-
ages for, among other things, the loss of business income, or the
cost of renting alternate premises during the period that the leased
premises were unusable.
In summary, section 365(h) is a powerful provision which gives
the real property lessee a secure position under the Code. The sec-
tion reaffirms the trustee's right to reject real property leases and
provides a uniform federal policy regarding the effects of such re-
jection. However, upon close analysis, it becomes apparent that the
trustee's power to reject real property leases is almost entirely illu-
sory, for it will be of no benefit to the estate where the perform-
ance of the lease is not a net loss to the estate. Where the perform-
ance of the lease does result in a net loss to the estate, the
rejection will often result in an increase in that loss. Thus, as origi-
212. See supra note 1.
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nally contemplated by the Commission Bill, when performance of a
lease by the estate results in a net loss, the trustee's remedial ac-
tion will often be abandonment of the premises to the lessee,
rather than rejection.
C. Rejection of Leases of Debtor-Lessees
If the debtor is a lessee under an unexpired lease, rejection of
the lease is treated in a straightforward manner by the Code.
Under section 365(g)(1), 213 a lease which has not been previously
assumed by the trustee or in a confirmed plan is treated, upon re-
jection, as if it were breached prior to the filing of the petition.
The relation-back function serves to give the lessor a pre-petition
allowable claim under section 502. Consistently, section 502(g) pro-
vides that claims arising from rejection (when there has been no
assumption) shall be determined and allowed as if the claim had
arisen prior to the petition. Section 501(d) provides that such
claims can be filed as pre-petition claims despite their post-peti-
tion occurrence and despite the fact that the time for filing of
proof of claims for ordinary pre-petition claims may have expired.
It should be noted that the nature of the lessor's claim for past due
rent, as well as damages arising from the breach of the lease, will
be an unsecured claim unless the lessor has otherwise secured the
debtor's performance under the lease. The one well-settled excep-
tion to this rule is that the lessor is entitled to payment from the
estate, as an administrative expense, of the reasonable value of the
estate's use and occupancy of the leased premises from the time of
the filing of the petition until the estate surrenders possession of
the premises.
2 14
When a lease has been assumed prior to rejection, section
365(g)(2) 2 15 provides that rejection, whether by the trustee or in
213. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
(g) [T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease-
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or under a
plan confirmed under chapters 9, 11, or 13 of this title, immediately before the
date of the filing of the petition.
214. See supra note 15.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
(g) [T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease-
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under this section or under a plan
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the plan, constitutes a post-petition breach. The lessor is entitled
to file his claim for past due rent, and damages arising from the
rejection, as a claim entitled to administrative expense priority
under section 503. Section 365(g)(2) also contains some rather
cumbersome language relating to the treatment of rejected con-
tracts and leases when there has been a conversion from a rehabili-
tation case under Chapter 11 or 13 to a liquidation case under
Chapter 7. Paragraph A of section 365(g)(2) applies to those cases
where no conversion has occurred under section 1112216 or 1307217
and simply provides that the breach arising from rejection will be
deemed to have occurred at the time of rejection. However, when a
conversion has occurred, paragraph B provides that such breach
will be deemed to have occurred "(i) immediately before the date
of such conversion, if such contract or lease was assumed before
such conversion; or (ii) at the time of such rejection, if such con-
tract or lease was assumed after such conversion.' ' 21 8 The purpose
of this rather awkward language is related to the hierarchical
scheme set forth in section 726(a) of the Code.219 That section pro-
vides that when a case had been converted from a Chapter 11 or 13
case to a liquidation case, then "administrative expenses incurred
under this chapter after such conversion have priority over ad-
ministrative expenses incurred under any other chapter of this
title. .... 2)22o Thus, when a conversion has occurred and the
debtor's assets are insufficient to pay all administrative expenses of
the estate, the administrative expenses of liquidation will have pri-
ority over the administrative expenses incurred in connection with
the attempted rehabilitation. Section 365(g) (2) (B) merely serves to
determine whether an assumed lease will be treated as a rehabilita-
confirmed under chapters 9, 11, or 13 of this title-
(A) if before such rejection the case has not been converted under section 1112
or 1307 of this title-
(B) if before such rejection the case has been converted under section 1112 or
1307 of this title-
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion, if such contract or lease was
assumed before such conversion; or
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or lease was assumed after such
conversion.
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982).
217. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).
218. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2)(B) (1982).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1982).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1982).
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tion or liquidation administrative expense. If the lease was as-
sumed prior to conversion, claims arising from rejection are treated
as administrative expenses of rehabilitation. If the lease was as-
sumed after conversion, it is treated as an administrative expense
of the liquidation proceeding, entitled to priority under section
726(b).
D. "Time" and "Financing" Leases
Some last, but extremely important, points must be made
about the claims of the non-debtor lessors. Subsection 502(b)(7)
continues the practice under the Bankruptcy Act of limiting the
allowable amount of the unsecured claims of real property lessors
arising from the rejection or other termination of real property
leases that have not been assumed.221 The lessor is limited in the
amount of his allowable claim to a sum which does not exceed the
aggregate of (i) the larger of the rent reserved in the lease for one
year (without acceleration) or fifteen percent of the remaining rent
reserved in the lease, not to exceed the rent reserved for three
years (without acceleration), following the earlier of the date of the
filing of the petition or the date on which the lessor repossessed, or
lessee surrendered, the premises; plus (ii) the amount of unpaid
and past due rentals accrued prior to the earlier of such dates.2 22
The purpose of the limitation is to allow the lessor to file a claim
for all past due rentals but to limit the amount of the lessor's claim
for future rentals which, depending on state law, might be ex-
tremely large and therefore might dilute the distribution to other
unsecured creditors. This purpose was clearly recognized in the
House Report, which noted:
[Subsection 502(b)(7)] is designed to compensate the landlord for his loss
while not permitting a claim so large (based on a long-term lease) as to pre-
221. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
222. Section 502 prescribes which claims filed under section 501 will be allowed as
claims against the estate. In certain cases, section 502 limits the amount of allowable claims.
Section 501 and 502 relate to claims other than administrative expense claims, which are
independently provided for by section 503. Thus, the limitation of lessor's claims under
section 502(b)(7) does not apply to leases which have been assumed by the trustee and then
rejected, since the resulting lessor's claim is entitled to be filed and allowed as an adminis-
trative expense claim under section 503. The House report indicated with respect to section
502(b)(7) that "[t]his subsection does not apply to limit administrative expense claims for
use of the leased premises to which the landlord is otherwise entitled." House Report, supra
note 1, at 353.
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vent other unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend for the estate....
The sliding scale formula is new, is designed to protect the long-term lessor,
and is included as a replacement of the dual provisions in current law of a
three-year test for reorganization cases and a one-year test for liquidation
cases.
223
The history of the limitation on lessor's damage claims is set out in
detail in many other writings. 224 It need not be repeated here ex-
cept to indicate that its primary purpose is to protect the estate
from extravagant unsecured claims by lessors.
There is some potential confusion about the application of sec-
tion 502(b)(7) in sale-leaseback transactions. There is a lengthy
statement in the Senate and House debates asserting that the pro-
visions of section 502(b)(7) will be applicable only to "true" or
"bona fide" leases, but not to "financing" leases.225 The distinction,
according to the House and Senate debates, is meant to protect the
creditor-lender who is using the lease as a financing vehicle to se-
cure a loan to the debtor.226 Recognizing the "financing" nature of
many long-term leases, the legislative commentary indicates that
223. House Report, supra note 1; at 353.
224. 2 COLLIER (15th ed.), supra note 31. 1 365.04 at 365-50 sets out an unusually
lengthy and detailed history of the origins of the limitation on lessor's damage claims. See
also, Oldden v. Tonto Realty Co., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944) for an excellent discussion of
the history of the treatment of landlords' claims under the bankruptcy laws.
225. Extensive statements regarding the distinction between "true" and "financing"
leases were read into the Senate and House Debates. 124 CoNr. REc. S17,410, H11,093
(1978j. Because of their length, they are not reproduced here.
226. In contemporary sale-leaseback transactions, the debtor is the original owner of a
parcel of property which he intends to use as security for a loan, often for the purposes of
constructing improvements on the property. Rather than obtaining a loan secured by a
mortgage upon the property, it may be advantageous to sell the property to a lender with
the sale conditioned upon a contemporaneous "leaseback." The lease will typically contain
an option to purchase and the purchase price will be closely tied to the lease payments,
declining as more lease payments are made. The debtor thereby obtains the necessary
financing and retains possession of the property. These payments (and reduction in repur-
chase price) are usually identical to mortgage interest and principal payments (and reduc-
tion in outstanding principal). In a related financing scheme, a potential purchaser of prop-
erty may elect to lease the property with an option to purchase, rather than purchasing the
property through an installment contract, or obtaining third-party mortgage financing.
Again, the lease payments and purchase price are, in fact, little more than interest payments
and principal payments related to the financing, rather than the use, of the property. In
both leasing arrangements, the transaction is intended as a loan to the debtor secured by
the lender's retention of a reversionary interest in the property. In the event that the debtor
defaults in repayment, the lender can simply terminate the lease and repossess the property.
On the other hand, upon payment of all of the reserved rental and the nominal repurchase
price, the lessee is entitled to a conveyance of a fee simple title to the property.
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section 502(b)(7) should not apply to such leases because the "les-
sors" are actually lenders and should be able to submit claims for
the full amotint of the debtor's loan obligations.22
The approach suggested in the legislative debates seems en-
tirely ill-fitted to the purposes of section 502(b)(7) and should be
disregarded by the courts. Whether or not the lease was meant to
serve as security for a loan or whether it was a "true" lease does
not affect the lessor's right to repossess and relet, or sell the prop-
erty. Indeed, the lessor of a "financing lease" will receive exactly
what he bargained for in the event of the debtor's default: fee sim-
ple title to the property. The lessor may dispose of the property as
he sees fit, thereby satisfying much of the outstanding balance of
the loan to the debtor. This would seem to be the most compelling
circumstance for limiting the claim of a lessor. Like the lessor of a
ninety-nine-year "true" ground lease, the lessor of a "financing
lease" has an excessive claim which can be mitigated by reletting
or selling the lease property, whereas allowing the claim would
substantially reduce the claims of other unsecured creditors. If sec-
tion 502(b)(7) is not applied in the case of "financing leases," then
the creditor-lessors under such leases will be placed in a position
which they never bargained for. They can retain the property and
recover additional payments from the lessee. Hopefully, the courts
will ignore the language of the debates and apply section 502(b)(7)
to all leases under the Code.
CONCLUSION
Many suggestions have been made herein for judicial resolu-
tion of the multitude of unresolved- issues which arise under the
novel provisions of section 365. There are, however, three major
problem areas which demand special attention from the bank-
ruptcy courts and, in one area, Congress. First, the cure provisions
of section 365(b) vest the trustee with extraordinary curative pow-
ers of a type and degree unknown under pre-Code law. This inde-
pendent ability to cure lease defaults inserts an unpredictable ele-
ment into general lease transactions. The expectations and plans of
non-debtor parties, encapsulated in their lease agreements, are
subject to de facto modification by the virtue of the independent,
statutory cure of section 365. To the extent that the original expec-
227. See supra note 225.
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tations of the lease parties are not fully respected in a bankruptcy
case, the outcome of lease agreements becomes unpredictable. To
secure stability in the leasing marketplace, the bankruptcy courts
must make an in depth analysis of the original expectation of the
lease parties before affirming the trustee's cure. In view of the
complexity of modern real property transactions, such inquiry will
require a complete understanding of the business motivations of
the parties in executing the lease and including (or excluding) re-
strictive use and cure provisions. Resolution of this factual ques-
tion will require a full evidentiary hearing. To the extent that a
non-debtor party can establish for the court a legitimate commer-
cial expectation that will be materially upset by the trustee's cure,
the attempt to cure should be denied by the bankruptcy court.
A second serious problem faces the bankruptcy courts. The
prevailing view is that the trustee cannot assume a lease which is
successfully terminated prior to the filing of a petition, since such a
lease is not "unexpired." Unfortunately, this raises a potential for
inequity and abuse in those cases where the debtor has substantial
value in the leasehold which, if the lease cannot be assumed, will
be forfeited to the non-debtor. In view of the role of the bank-
ruptcy courts as courts of equity, such a consequence can hardly be
justified if there are compelling circumstances impelling continua-
tion of the lease. Relying upon the rational in Queens Boulevard
and other pre-Code cases, a strong argument can be made that
pre-petition termination does not, in compelling circumstances,
block the trustee from curing and assuming the lease.
Finally, an unforeseen dilemma arises under section 365(h).
There are situations in which the trustee of a debtor-lessor will
wish to reject a real-property lease because the continuation of the
lease will result in a net loss to the estate. Unfortunately, due to
the offset rights given to the lessee by section 365(h), the rejection
may serve to increase the loss to the estate. Obviously, the only
course of action available to the trustee in such circumstances will
be to abandon the leased property, thereby sacrificing the rever-
sionary value. It seems unlikely that this consequence was in-
tended when section 365(h) was drafted. Some Congressional re-
view of this provision may be in order.
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